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This thesis examines the criminal networks used to penetrate Texas by the Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS 13) street gang. MS 13’s internal reach is analyzed by examining the 
existing and potential horizontal integration of the known cliques (gang cells). 
Additionally, the organizations’ existing reach and potential transnational reach are 
analyzed by examining the existing and potential vertical integration between its 
domestic and Central American components. The identification of MS 13’s criminal 
networks is completed by using a first-generation manual approach lens. This approach 
involves examining data to uncover associations between criminals, resulting in the 
creation of an association matrix that links MS-13 with affiliates. 
The research shows that MS 13 is a significant threat to public security in the state 
of Texas for two main reasons: proximity to cartels and demographics of the state. 
Research shows that criminal networks are already at work and that MS 13 should be 
taken seriously in Texas. The risk to Texas stems from the similarities, in terms of 
demographics and proximity to transnational cartels, to Los Angeles, California, where 
MS 13 originated. 
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 1 
I. DEFINING MARA SALVATRUCHA’S (MS 13) TEXAS 
CRIMINAL NETWORK 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore horizontal and vertical relationships of 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13) and analyze the criminal network MS 13 is using to establish 
gang-controlled territory in cities throughout the state of Texas. The data analyzed will 
focus on the horizontal and vertical relations of other gangs and transnational criminal 
organizations vis-à-vis MS 13. The first-generation manual approach of analyzing 
criminal networks provides an appropriate tool to identify horizontal and vertical network 
expansion throughout this thesis. Using the first-generation manual approach, the analysis 
of MS 13’s criminal network is achieved by “examining data files to identify associations 
between criminals,” resulting in the creation of an association matrix linking MS 13 and 
known affiliates.1 By taking open source information detailing the associations of 
criminal elements with MS 13, this thesis will identify the network MS 13 is using to 
penetrate cities across the state of Texas. 
Mara Salvatrucha has a presence in the state of Texas, and this thesis will 
examine the networks used to expand its presence within the state.2 By explaining the 
potential and existing horizontal integration of the known cliques in cities within the 
state, this thesis will describe MS 13’s internal reach. Additionally, a look at potential 
and existing vertical integration between MS 13’s stateside based component, Latin 
American components, and other transnational criminal organizations will be studied to 
understand MS 13’s potential and existing transnational reach within the state of Texas. 
As the reported most dangerous gang in the United States, Mara Salvatrucha has many 
known networks with the strongholds in Los Angeles (L.A.), Central America, and 
                                                 
1 Jennifer J. Xu and Hsinchun Chen, “CrimeNet Explorer: A Framework for Criminal Network 
Knowledge Discovery,” ACM Transactions on Information Systems 23, no. 2 (2005): 201–26, doi: 
10.1145/1059981.1059984. 
2 Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Gang Threat Assessment (TX: Joint Crime Information 
Center, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Division, 2014), 8–9, http://www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff/ 
media_and_communications/2014/txGangThreatAssessment.pdf. 
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Washington, DC, region. These established networks can serve as blueprints for 
expansion to cities within the state of Texas.3 
This thesis seeks to define the networks used by MS 13 by analyzing known 
associations used by MS 13 to penetrate Texas. The research question, significance, and 
relevant literature are addressed in the first chapter. The second chapter focuses on the 
historical background of El Salvador; it links the origins of the violent gang known today 
as MS 13 to a violent past dating to 1932. The third chapter discusses the establishment 
and expansion of the MS13 network through the lens of U.S. policy, media, and 
demographics. This chapter introduces MS 13 strongholds in L.A., Central America, and 
DC. The first three chapters set the background for the fourth, which covers MS 13 
networks in Texas. The fourth chapter addresses what known horizontal and vertical 
networks can tell us about the current networks utilized by MS 13 to further penetrate the 
state of Texas. The final chapter presents the conclusion and recommendations of best 
practices utilized elsewhere for employment in Texas. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF DEFINING THE MS 13 NETWORK IN TEXAS 
This thesis seeks to analyze data pertaining to MS 13 and its known affiliates to 
answer the following question—what criminal network(s) has MS 13 used to penetrate 
cities within the state of Texas? As early as 1993, MS 13 was established in L.A. and 
suspected to be involved in criminal activity, including, but not limited to, drug 
trafficking, extortion, robbery, and murder.4 In 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) gave Mara Salvatrucha the title of being the most dangerous street gang in 
America.5 In 2014, the gang is noted as having expanded and migrated across the United 
States, being active in forty-two states and the District of Columbia.6 Texas is one of the 
                                                 
3 Sam Logan and Ashley Morse, “MS – 13 Organization & U.S. Response” Samuellogan.com, 
February 2007. http://www.samuellogan.com/publications.html. 
4 Al Valdez, “The Origins of Southern California Latino Gangs,” in Maras: Gang Violence and 
Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2011), 29. 
5 Ibid. 
6 John P. Sullivan and Samuel Logan, “MS-13 Leadership: Networks of Influence,” Counter Terrorist, 
August-September 2010, http://digital.ipcprintservices.com/display_article.php?id=428186. 
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forty-two states in which MS 13 is active. Taking U.S. policy, demographics, and the 
Cable News Network (CNN) effect into consideration allows the similarities between 
South Texas and other MS 13 strongholds to become evident. 
Being a border state, Texas is front and center for the nation’s battles on 
immigration. Additionally, the Texas border offers two drop points for La Bestia, or the 
immigrant train, that provides Central American immigrants access to the Rio Grande 
Valley in South Texas and El Paso in West Texas.7 With the recent influx of Central 
Americans into the state, it is important to understand the risk of allowing these 
immigrants to fend for themselves. A similar influx of repatriated gang members led to 
big problems for Central America due to the opportunity repatriation allowed for 
expanding the MS 13 network. Network expansion is a major concern for Texas. 
Other concerns for all cities in regard to horizontal and vertical integration within 
the state of Texas are the alliances of MS 13 and other criminal elements. Shortly after 
organizing in L.A., MS 13 formed alliances with the prison gang Mexican Mafia, which 
ran the street gang Sureño 13 network. Both of those criminal groups are present in 
Texas. The Texas Department of Public Safety divides the state into six regions and 
provides an assessment of the most significant gangs in each region. Regions one and two 
include the larger cities of Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston, respectively. MS 13 is noted 
as having a significant presence in both regions.8 The additional four regions have listed 
associates of MS 13 as having a significant presence in each of them.9 With the Mexican 
Mafia having a major presence in Texas, as they do in California, the expected 
continuance of the alliance formed by both gangs would be a reasonable hypothesis. 
According to the El Paso Police Department and El Paso County Sheriff’s office, Sureños 
“are now the second largest and criminally active gang in El Paso.”10 
                                                 
7 Rodrigo Dominguez Villegas, “Central American Migrants and ‘La Bestia’: The Route, Dangers, and 
Government Responses,” Migration Policy Institute, September 10, 2014, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
article/central-american-migrants-and-la-bestia-route-dangers-and-government-responses. 
8 Ibid., 18–19. 
9 Ibid., 19–20. 
10 Texas Department of Public Safety, Gang Threat Assessment, 21. 
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The vertical integration or transnational element of MS 13 is also a significant 
concern for the state of Texas. MS 13 has documented partnerships with Los Zetas, Gulf, 
Sinaloa, and La Familia Michoacãna cartels that originate in Mexico.11 All four cartels 
have networks that stretch into Texas.12 Their presence in Texas means there may be 
potential for further expansion of the MS 13 Network within the state. Since MS 13 has a 
known affiliation with both transnational criminal organizations and prison gangs, it is 
necessary to understand the depth of these relationship. Additionally, in terms of 
recruitment, Texas presents favorable conditions when compared with other locations 
where the gang grew. 
The demographics of the state of Texas are an important aspect of the potential 
and existing horizontal and vertical criminal associations. Once MS 13 establishes itself 
in the Hispanic dense communities of South Texas, the reputation it has built for itself 
may have a positive effect on its ability to recruit. The Hispanic population of Texas has 
shown signs of growth across the board but specifically in South Texas.13 The growth 
among the Hispanic population, MS 13’s experience in recruiting, and its understanding 
of the culture could pose a risk to cities in South Texas. Hypothetically, if a young man 
or woman has an option between joining a local gang or the local chapter of the most 
dangerous gang in America, one can only guess what the choice will be. MS 13 
recruitment efforts have led to a network that consists of ten thousand members 
nationwide.14 
For the aforementioned reasons and others that will be discussed later, the 
significance of the networks used by MS 13 to penetrate Texas are extremely important. 
The consequences for not intervening and disrupting the networks used by MS 13 could 
place cities in Texas in a worse position than L.A. was in the 1990s. MS 13 has a 
                                                 
11 National Gang Intelligence Center, 2013 National Gang Report (Washington, DC: Author, 2013), 
23, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-report-2013/view. 
12 Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013 (TX: Author, 2013), 
14, http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/threatOverview.pdf. 
13 Susan Combs, “Window on State Government,” Texas Comptroller, accessed November 4, 2014, 
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/tif/southtexas/demographics.html. 
14 National Gang Intelligence Center, 2013 National Gang Report, 23. 
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significant presence in and around Dallas and Houston, Texas.15 Yet San Antonio is not 
mentioned as a stronghold of MS 13. Coincidentally, San Antonio is the second largest 
city in Texas with only Houston outranking it in population.16 Texas’ second largest city 
is closer to both drop points of La Bestia than Houston or Dallas, making it a city that 
could be the next MS 13 stronghold. The city’s size, location, and demographics make it 
a location for MS 13’s growth. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is little literature pertaining to MS 13’s criminal networks within the state 
of Texas. All literature found in books covering MS 13 is focused on the gang itself and 
on areas outside of Texas. This is due to the threat MS 13 constitutes to areas such as 
L.A. and the Washington, DC, region. The vital role of U.S. policy, demographics, and 
media vis-à-vis MS 13’s exponential growth is a common occurrence in relevant 
literature. All books and scholarly articles also detail the origins of Mara Salvatrucha in 
L.A. and link the gang to the Salvadorian immigrants who fled the country during the 
civil war. The account of marginal, impoverished Salvadorian immigrants looking for 
means of protection from the African American and Mexican American gangs is 
recounted in every piece of literature found. 
Additionally, there are many terms and definitions that will be used throughout 
this thesis while working to define MS 13’s Texas network. Horizontal integration, 
vertical integration, balloon effect, CNN effect, Texas Gang Threat Assessment report’s 
weights, and the Washington, DC region will all be discussed to clarify their significance 
and definition throughout this thesis. These terms are definitions require the reader to be 
familiar with the context in which they are used throughout this thesis. 
Horizontal and vertical integration are terms that will be used to describe 
domestic and transnational growth. Horizontal integration refers to lateral expansion here 
                                                 
15 Celinda Franco, The MS-14 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats? (CRS 
Report No. RL34233) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
row/RL34233.pdf. 
16 Bureau of the Census, “2010 Census: Population of Texas Cities, Arranged in Descending Order,” 
Texas State Library and Archives Commission, 2010, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/ 
popcity32010.html. 
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in the United States. Vertical integration refers to transnational integration. Furthermore, 
the term balloon effect will be used outside of its normal definition, which ties policy to 
the displacement of drug production. In this thesis, the balloon effect is used to define the 
displacement of people, cliques, and networks due to implemented anti-gang/immigration 
policies. 
Another term from the literature that will be heavily utilized is the CNN effect. 
The notion of the CNN effect emerged after media pundits across the nation noticed the 
propensity of Americans to be glued to their television sets watching nonstop war 
coverage during the Gulf War.17 CNN was the first nonstop news channel available. The 
Gulf War, and later U.S. military interventions, showed that people would gravitate to 
news coverage, even at the risk of becoming addicted to late-breaking details. 
The formal definition of the CNN effect varies. For some commentators of post-
Cold War interventions, it “described the capacity of images of human suffering, 
delivered in real time, to mobilize outrage worldwide, forcing national governments and 
international agencies to ameliorate humanitarian crisis or take up arms on behalf of the 
underdogs in ‘other people’s wars.’”18 Others reveled at the ability of television to 
“animate Moral consciousness.”19 Conversely, George F. Kennan saw television’s 
cardinal sin as an induction of an emotional reaction causing “sentimentality that could 
only impede the formulation of sagacious policy.”20 Overall, the CNN effect’s focus is 
on the media’s power to make issues relevant, inciting a push for policy vis-à-vis the 
display of powerful images. Philip Seib, the vice dean and professor of the Public Policy 
Program at the University of Southern California, states, “the media, local, and global, 
are the means of communication through which the public mind is formed.”21 The CNN 
effect will be used to portray the importance of the media along with U.S. policy and 
demographics in the creation of the horizontal and vertical MS 13 networks we see today. 
                                                 
17 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 142. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 143. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 10. 
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Additionally, the Texas Gang Threat Assessment report’s three-tier system will be 
referenced to categorize the risk MS 13 represents. The weights used to calculate the risk 
each gang represents include the following: 
• Relationship with Cartels: This factor examines the extent to which a 
gang is connected to Mexico-based drug cartels. A gang may be assessed 
as having no relationship, a temporary or short-term association, or a long-
term business venture or exclusive relationship. 
• Transnational criminal activity: This factor considers whether a gang 
has transnational criminal connections, as well as whether the gang’s 
criminal activity has spread into the transnational realm. 
• Level of criminal activity: This factor rates the type and frequency of 
crimes perpetrated by the gang. Crimes are rated on a scale covering a 
range of offenses, from misdemeanors to felonies. 
• Level of violence: This factor assesses the overall level of violence 
perpetrated by the gang in its criminal activity. It ranges from generally 
non-violent offenses, such as money laundering, to crimes involving 
extreme violence, such as torture and murder. 
• Prevalence throughout Texas: This factor determines the extent to which 
a gang is active throughout the state. The geographic reach of some gangs 
is limited to specific cities or regions of Texas, while others are 
widespread across the state. 
• Relationships with other gangs: This factor examines the nature of a 
gang’s alliances and influence with other gangs. This may involve limited 
and temporary contact or formal alliances, or the direct oversight of some 
gangs by others. 
• Total strength: This factor assesses the known size of the gang, measured 
by the number of individuals confirmed by law enforcement and criminal 
justice agencies to be members. This number is almost always an 
underrepresentation of the true size of the gang, as many members are 
unknown to law enforcement. 
• Statewide organizational effectiveness: This factor examines the gang’s 
effectiveness in organizing members under its leadership across the state.  
• Juvenile membership: This factor considers the extent to which the gang 
recruits juveniles and is active in schools, as recruitment of minors is a 
unique threat. 
• Threat to law enforcement: This factor considers the extent to which the 
gang represents a threat to law enforcement. Some gang members may 
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only use violence to resist arrest or to flee from law enforcement, while 
others may actively target officers. 
• Involvement in human smuggling and trafficking: This factor considers 
the gang’s involvement in human smuggling and human trafficking 
activities.22 
An understanding of these weights is crucial to understand why MS 13’s 
movement from one to another is significant. A tier one threat constitutes the biggest risk 
to the state and is much more significant than a tier two or tier three gang. The weights 
above are all considered by the state to determine the tier a gang belongs to.  
MS 13’s growth in Central America and the U.S. is discussed to explain how the 
gang acquired the influence it has today. The two U.S. locations discussed are Los 
Angeles, CA and Washington, DC. Traditionally, the Washington, DC, region normally 
consists of the District of Columbia (DC) and 19 counties across Maryland (MD) and 
Virginia (VA). The entire region is not included in the source used. The areas included 
under DC from this point forward will be limited to the same areas included in Connie 
McGuire’s research paper titled “Working paper on Central American youth gangs in the 
Washington, DC, area.”23 She completed this paper while working for the Washington 
Office in Latin America (WOLA). The areas included in MD are Montgomery and Prince 
George’s counties. In VA, only Fairfax County is included with the final area being DC 
itself.24 McGuire’s paper offers insight into the Salvadoran presence in the region and 
illustrates the relationship between Salvadorans and MS 13 in DC.25 
The terms and concepts from the literature pertaining to the expansion of MS 13’s 
Network in Texas will be used along with the first generation manual approach in 
analyzing associations of the actors in MS 13’s criminal networks. This approach will 
allow for a location-based comparative framework to analyze the role U.S. policy, 
demographics, and media have had in the creation of MS 13, its networks, and its growth. 
                                                 
22 Texas Department of Public Safety, Gang Threat Assessment, 9-10. 
23 Connie McGuire, “Working paper on Central American youth gangs in the Washington, DC, area,” 




Specifically, relevant data from L.A., Central America, and DC region will be analyzed 
comparatively to identify horizontal and vertical networks in Texas. 
The data used to support this thesis come from a variety of sources. The goal is to 
construct and support my thesis using only open source information. Since there is no 
concise literature that defines the MS 13 network in the state of Texas, it was necessary 
to reach far and wide to define the MS 13 Network. Sources that will be referred to in this 
thesis range from local newspaper articles to national task force reports that focus on 
street, prison, and transnational gangs. Sources such as Insight crime, Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI), Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the U.S. Border 
Patrol are key references in defining the MS 13 Network. Open source information from 
the Texas Department of Public Safety and various police departments across South 
Texas are also used to identify MS 13’s Texas Network. 
The analysis of a Texas network, however, would not be possible without the 
works of the leading researchers on MS 13 such as Thomas Bruneau, Al Valdez, Sonja 
Wolf, and Jose Miguel Cruz. The combined work of these researchers allows for a great 
base for further research. Sonja Wolf’s explanation of how the Salvadoran media spurred 
the growth of MS 13 allowed me to use “Nexis” to analyze the effects of the media here 
in the United States.26 It is by following the groundwork of these researchers that I will 
be able to analyze the myriad of sources compiled to define the MS 13 network in Texas. 
Analysis of the information found will focus on the alliances set up in each 
stronghold across the United States and then in Texas. The intelligence gained from 
Brenda Paz will be analyzed to establish existing networks. Information provided by Paz 
will be used to highlight the already established horizontal integration of MS 13 and paint 
the picture of what MS 13 believes is its destiny. Through the use of available literature, 
the comparative analysis of MS 13’s domestic and transnational strongholds will be used 
to define the networks used by MS 13 to penetrate Texas. 
  
                                                 
26 Sonja Wolf, “Creating Folk Devils: Street Gang Representations in El Salvador Print Media,” 
Journal of Human Security 8, no. 2 (2012). 
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II. A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 
Although Mara Salvatrucha was established in L.A., the gang’s home country is 
where its legacy of violence originates. El Salvador is a country with a past that is riddled 
by repression and violence. This chapter will address the legacy of violence, linking the 
historical repression and violence of El Salvador to the American experience with MS 13. 
On October 11, 2012, MS13 was designated as a transnational criminal organization by 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, a first for a street gang.27 Today, MS 13 represents 
a threat significant enough to warrant attention at the federal level. It is important to draw 
the link between the legacy of violence stemming from El Salvador to the United States 
because many of the originating members were immigrants of El Salvador who fled to 
the United States during and after the Civil War. Scholars have stated that the violent 
habitat that the Salvadorians left never left them. The violence experienced in El Salvador 
provided the founding members of MS 13 with a propensity for violence unmatched by 
American gangsters.28 
To help link violence between El Salvador and MS 13, this chapter will discuss 
the economic, political, and social repression Salvadorans experienced since from 1887–
1992. The first section will cover 1872–1932, the period that included La Matanza. The 
second section covers 1932–69, the period that included The Hundred Hour War of 1969. 
The Final Section will take us from 1969–92, focusing on the Civil War that engulfed El 
Salvador from 1980 through 1992. The relevance of these events will help explain how a 
historical background saturated with repression and cyclic violent acts aided the quick 
rise of MS 13 in the United States. 
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Peasant, or campesino, uprisings in El Salvador began to take place as early as 
1872 in the coffee producing regions of El Salvador.29 These outbursts were due to the 
government ousting campesinos from their land in favor of coffee producers. 
Development of dyes in Europe in 1879 rendered indigo, El Salvador’s largest export, 
useless.30 The lack of demand for indigo opened the door for coffee to become the 
country’s leading export. In 1881, the Salvadoran government instituted land reform that 
stripped communal land from campesinos, leaving them without livelihood.31 The 
uprisings continued into the 20th century as did the deterioration of the campesinos’ 
living conditions. The uprisings slowly morphed into violence by 1932. 
The violent civilian-led uprising that took place on January 22, 1932, was the 
birth of the legacy of violence in El Salvador. This outburst, and the reaction known as 
La Matanza, started an era laden with violence that continued through the end of the Civil 
War in 1992. La Matanza, demonstrates the violent history and origins of what the FBI 
named America’s most dangerous street gang.32 La Matanza offered El Salvador a 
window into the future of the country. It provided the violent origins for a nation born in 
a bloodbath.33 Starting in 1932, the military government and the oligarchs continually 
worked hand in hand to suppress the left and remove any challenges to their authority in 
El Salvador. This repression led to various violent clashes often resulting in the death of 
peasants by way of government death squads. The conflict cemented a relationship 
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between the oligarchs (born of the coffee boom in El Salvador) and the armed forces.34 
This relationship lasted through the Civil War. Scholars agree that economic, political, 
and social repression were causal factors that led to the violent clashes in 1932. 
Economic, political, and social repression along with violence associated with efforts to 
quell campesino uprisings will be shown to be consistent causal factors for the legacy of 
violence left to the people of El Salvador. The same legacy of violence that has roots 
dating back to the time of La Matanza is seen in the establishment of MS 13 in LA. 
In 1932, La Matanza left 30,000 dead. These deaths originated from the well-
documented history of repression and violence between the campesinos and the 
oligarchy. Repression is the root cause of the bloodbath that created a period of 
praetorianism the campesinos endured from 1932 through the Civil War. Bloodbath 
refers to La Matanza, the government’s reaction to a campesino uprising in 1932. 
Campesino uprisings, however, came far before La Matanza. 
The difference in 1932, was the reaction by the new president, General 
Maximiliano Hernàndez Martinez (1931–1944).35 The consensus among scholars is that 
president “General Maximiliano Hernàndez Martinez, who had assumed the presidency 
just weeks following a military coup that deposed President Araujo, responded swiftly 
and decisively; on his orders the National Guard and local military and police forces 
marched through the countryside and systematically targeted all those suspected of 
participating in the rebellion.”36 This reaction by President Martinez left El Salvador an 
estimated 30,000 dead, mostly campesinos. Furthermore, “This ‘grotesque’ revenge, for 
which president Martinez earned the nickname El Brujo (The Sorcerer), resulted in so 
many thousands dead that burial became impractical; fearing epidemics, the Salvadoran 
department of Sanitation ordered the incineration of all corpses.”37 
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Aside from the sheer brutality the campesinos faced after their unsuccessful 
rebellion, the culture of violence by the government continued. Violence served as a 
solution to the peasant problem. La Matanza served as an inaugural episode, which 
showcased the praetorianism period linking the military and oligarchs to control of El 
Salvador. Since La Matanza, the oligarchs and military have continued a relationship that 
remains focused on removing any opposition to their mutual interest. The establishment 
of the relationship between the military government and the oligarchs was built around a 
quest to maintain power. La Matanza and later episodes of government violence aimed at 
campesinos kept the pattern of violence through the Civil War. 
The campesinos also employed violence in their rebellion in 1932 so to say the 
use of violence was solely on the government’s side would be wrong. Since 1932, when 
the campesinos chose to rebel against the oligarchs due to their economic and political 
conditions, violence has been the solution to problems within El Salvador. Scholars agree 
that economic, political, and social repression were causal factors that led to various 
violent clashes between the campesinos and the government of El Salvador. Additionally, 
Elisabeth Jean Wood suggests the campesino motivation to mobilize rested in 
“participation, defiance and pleasure in agency,” with previous exposure to violence and 
proximity to insurgent forces shaping mobilization paths.38 According to Wood, 
participation is tied to liberation theology and the campesino belief that social justice is 
the will of God and thus a moral commitment. Defiance, too, is tied to liberation theology 
and the will of those who survived governmental violence to not let the death of previous 
campesinos be in vain. Pleasure in agency refers to “the pleasure in together changing 
unjust social structures through intentional action.”39 As for the exposure to violence, 
Wood make a rational suggestion that those who saw the violence of the government 
were likely to support the guerrillas and vice versa. She also explains that the closer 
campesinos were to guerrilla forces, the more likely they were to support them. 
Campesinos had to act rationally to ensure their survival. 
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The government and oligarchs also had some identifiable attitudinal 
characteristics. Cynthia Arnson best sums up the attitude of the government and oligarchs 
when she writes, “both the military and the oligarchy were determined that ‘communist 
agitation’ would never again be allowed to disrupt the social fabric of El Salvador.”40 
Since their marriage under President Martinez in response to the uprising of 1932, the 
government and the military worked hand in hand. Further, the constant economic, 
political, and social repression led the people of El Salvador to resort to violence from the 
time of La Matanza through the Civil War. 
The economic causal factor for La Matanza is centered on coffee and the 
depression era economy, which put an already poor campesino population in an 
economic bind. Campesino victimization at the hand of the coffee industry began when 
the “Indigenous tribal lands and large municipal landholdings were abolished by 
presidential decrees in 1881–82.”41 The eviction from the land the campesinos called 
home was not without force. The government formed security forces to police the 
eviction. These security forces that were put in place to police the campesinos would go 
on to become the National Guard of El Salvador.42 One could tie the origins of the 
government—oligarch relationship to the stripping of land from campesinos as the 
government and oligarchs both saw the benefit of repressing the campesinos. The benefit 
for both was economic prosperity at the expense of the defenseless campesinos. 
An amplifying factor to the loss of land for the campesinos was the worldwide 
depression that took place from 1929–1931. The depression caused a chain of events that 
left many campesinos without a source of income. First, the depression brought about a 
free fall of the price of coffee. This is critical when one considers that by 1928, 92% of El 
Salvador’s exports were coffee.43 The worldwide depression created a worldwide lack of 
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demand for coffee. Lack of demand led to lower prices, and lower prices meant cuts had 
to take place to try and keep the agrarian system operational. The cuts forced thousands 
of campesinos out of work. This created a landless and jobless population. Those who 
kept jobs were not much better off than the jobless. Campesino salaries did not normally 
provide enough to purchase coffee from their harvest.44 However, loss of those salaries, 
no land to grow their own food supply, and hunger brought on by the lack of wages to 
purchase food created the uprising that led to La Matanza. Ultimately, it was the 
depression that caused an uprising fueled by hunger. As vassals of their landowners, the 
campesinos mobilized in an attempt to improve labor conditions, establish a minimum 
wage, and end unemployment. 
The initial mobilizations set a pattern of unequal reactions to the non-violent 
protest. Author Molly Todd says, “The government met campesino petitions, protest, and 
strikes with increasing force,” ultimately leading to a lawful inability to organize after 
reaching numbers of approximately eighty thousand.45 The campesinos took to the streets 
without resorting to violence until violence became their only option. Campesino 
organization began to take place in 1929, as soon as the impact of the dwindling coffee 
prices reached El Salvador. When then President Arturo Araujo (March–December 1931) 
began to allow his military force to be the primary option to deter the unrest, by allowing 
his men to open fire on protestors, the campesinos’ violent reaction was in short order. 
The violent reaction came in mid-January when “poorly armed and poorly organized 
peasants staged an uprising in western El Salvador, led by Socialist organizer Augustìn 
Faramundo Martì”—La Matanza was the government’s counter. 
Political repression also fueled the violence that ensued in 1932 and the uprising 
that caused La Matanza. The campesinos were a people with no representation in the 
Salvadoran government. After the stock market crash and reciprocal uprising of under 
and unemployed campesinos, President Pio Romero Bosque (1927–1931) outlawed the 
circulation of leftist material, and strikes, and he allowed the Army and National Guard to 
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imprison anyone who supported opposition activities.46 Without representation for the 
campesinos, the government and oligarchs fused their similar interest in keeping their 
opposition to a minimum leaving the campesinos politically isolated. In 1931, a wealthy 
landowner by the name of Arturo Araujo was elected president. The labor movement saw 
a potential ally as Araujo “promised a minimum standard of housing, health, education, 
and wages for all Salvadorans” but fell short because of uprisings, which were violently 
handled by his vice president General Martinez.47 In December of the same year, General 
Martinez took the presidency by way of coup. 
President Martinez was tested immediately by the left with the violent uprising, 
which led to La Matanza. Seeing the political instability within the right, Martì saw an 
opportunity to pull off an armed revolt.48 Unfortunately, the campesino revolt was too 
little, too soon. Having only been president for less than two months, President Martinez 
dealt a swift hand to the campesinos through La Matanza. As a known member of the 
opposition, Martì was initially arrested before the revolt on January 19, 1932, and faced 
death by way of firing squad on February 1, 1932, after the failed revolt.49 Violence was 
the answer for Martinez. His death squads killed an estimated thirty thousand people 
associated with the left.50 President Martinez’s violent nature may have been one formed 
from an admiration of other violent leaders. His admiration of violence was evident when 
“In the 1930s, he proclaimed his admiration for Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler.”51 
The praetorian system in place after La Matanza kept the characteristics of the 
regimes that caused the uprisings. The military government worked hand in hand with the 
oligarchs who had a vested interest in the continued repression of the campesinos. The 
violent element had a precedent, which dated back prior to La Matanza, as explained 
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earlier. Features of the partnered government of an Oligarch backed military regime, 
cemented by the events in 1932, that can be seen through the Civil War are as follows: 
(1) (A) weak state that never succeeded in challenging the interest of the 
dominant class, even when a challenge might have benefitted the long 
term interest of that class; (2) a division of labor between the armed 
forces, which controlled the major positions in government, and the land 
owning class, which dominated positions concerned with the economy; (3) 
a limited opening of the political process to the middle class and some 
urban workers (particularly after 1960) accompanied by the exclusion of 
independent political organizing in the country-side and repression 
directed against radical challenges to the system, both urban and rural; and 
(4) weak institutionalization of a political party and electoral system that 
never reach the point of a democratic transfer of power prior to 1980, 
though it possessed some of the trappings of democratic process.52 
The same economic, political, and social causal factors that caused the revolt led 
to La Matanza in 1932, and continued as the political and economic avenues for 
repression of campesinos remained in place. The violent actions taken by the 
governmental death squads directed at the campesinos resulted in dead bodies and 
continued violence. The marriage between the military and oligarchs benefited both 
parties. Both parties were interested in keeping obstacles from impairing their ability to 
impose their will. In El Salvador, the campesinos were the obstacle. The failure of the 
government to identify the root cause of the revolt left the potential for continued 
violence among the feuding campesinos on the left and the government on the right. As 
campesino uprisings occurred, violent counters in the form of death squads took action on 
behalf of the government. As the evidence will show, the violence experienced by 
Salvadorans in 1932 continued. The era of violence had just begun. The economic and 
political repression caused the social repression of campesinos, which led to further 
violence. The economic hardships endured by the landless campesinos led many to move 
to the Honduran border region for work. That area would be the center of gravity for The 
Hundred Hour War of 1969. The Salvadoran government proclaimed their stance was 
rooted in the defense of the Salvadorans who were ousted by the Honduran government. 
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B. 1932–1969 
On July 14, 1969, the Salvadoran army launched an attack on Honduras in honor 
of the campesinos who had lived through decades of being ignored, leaving a thousand 
casualties in the wake of the four day conflict.53 Violence did not end in El Salvador after 
the gruesome experience the country had with La Matanza. The time period between La 
Matanza and the Hundred Hour War was a continuation of the status quo set by the 
marriage of the oligarchs and the government. The continued repression of campesinos 
led many to immigrate to Honduras where there was work to be found. Industrial 
expansion in El Salvador led to higher employment numbers; however, employment 
came in urban areas such as San Salvador. This formed the beginnings of a new middle 
class in San Salvador “thereby worsening the disparities in living standards between this 
centre and the country as a whole.”54 Campesinos in both Honduras and El Salvador had 
the same enemy—landowners. As Lisa North explains, “during his fieldwork in the 
Honduran countryside, William Durham found no hostility among Honduran peasants 
toward Salvadorans. On the contrary, all evidence pointed to cooperation in a joint 
struggle against large landowners.”55 Having an estimated three hundred thousand 
Salvadorans living in Honduras, the Honduran elite had a viable scapegoat in the 
Salvadoran immigrants for peasant uprising within Honduras.56 The peasant uprisings 
happening in Honduras, stemming from socialist ideals, were also seen as a threat to the 
Salvadoran government. 
The Salvadoran government painted the Hundred Hour War as a defense of the 
Salvadoran campesinos who were experiencing a violent dispossessing at Honduran 
hands. The government reported, “Hondurans had systematically swept through their 
border region territory in the weeks prior to military engagement, violently dispossessing 
Salvadoran immigrants of their land and belongings and forcefully expelling them from 
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their country.”57 The Salvadoran government did not acknowledge the reason behind 
there being immigrants from El Salvador in Honduras. Instead, they chose to focus on the 
similar treatment of campesinos by the Honduran government. The government of El 
Salvador would go on to claim the campesinos who were now being prosecuted were the 
same ones who were Honduran agricultural pioneers. Furthermore, “in the words of the 
Salvadoran President, ‘no nation that values its own dignity can permit its own children 
to be massacred with impunity.’”58 Expectedly, the campesinos had a very different 
perception of the Hundred Hour War. 
The campesinos, whose rights the Salvadoran government claimed it was 
defending, were of the belief that the conflict was instigated by El Salvador.59 The 
sentiment among campesinos was one of a fraud on the part of the Salvadoran 
government. Campesinos claimed the main goal of the war was to militarize the northern 
border with Honduras then gain control over the “increasingly mobilized peasant 
population.”60 The organization of campesinos in peasant leagues, agricultural co-ops, 
and mutual aid groups had gained strength throughout the 1960s. Prior to the 
mobilization within the campesino communities in the border region, the government 
paid no attention to the campesinos.61 The demonstrations that were occurring prior to 
the war were due to the same economic and political isolation the campesinos faced 
before La Matanza. 
The political and economic situation the campesinos faced in the late 1960s 
mirrored those of the early 1930s. By 1969, the coffee industry had bounced back from 
the industry collapse due to the world economic crash in the early 1930s. As coffee and 
other cash crops began to take up additional land for additional production, it was the 
campesinos who gave it up. Analysis shows, “in 1961, 19.8 percent of families were 
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without land; in 1971, 41.1 percent were landless.”62 As production of crops grew, the 
campesinos’s situation got worse. Their organization only made matters worse. The lack 
of political gains since the early thirties made it so that the organization of campesinos 
was seen as a threat. When the government and oligarchs saw this threat, similar to that 
of 1932, it was met with violence. The percentage provided above on land loss shows the 
repression did not stop in 1969. The economic and political repression continued to 
plague the campesinos through the next decade and into the Civil War. 
C. 1969–1992 
The Salvadoran Civil War (1980–1992) was a continuation of the violence by 
both the campesinos and the government of El Salvador. However, the struggle within El 
Salvador began to involve groups outside of the Salvadoran oligarchy/government and 
campesinos. The Catholic Church, United States and Soviet Union were all heavily 
involved in the events that took place during the Civil War. The Church was looking out 
for the peasants, while the United States and Soviet Union were fighting the Cold War 
with Salvadoran bodies. In El Salvador, the government backed oligarchs used death 
squads to control any opposition to their rule.63 The left, after years of trying to achieve 
equality through political avenues, turned to violence.64 The same struggles that plagued 
El Salvador in 1932 were alive and well during the Civil War. The campesinos were still 
predominately a landless people struggling economically while striving for political 
equality within their country. The oligarchs still had their grasp on the economy and had 
the government in pocket to help deal with any type of opposition to their rule. 
 The campesinos’ movement and the Matrì led uprising in 1932 had continued to 
develop since then. Various parties of campesinos had formed since the original 
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Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) in 1932.65 After the Hundred Hour War of 1969, 
The Popular Liberation Forces Party (FPL) was established in 1970. Two years later the 
Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was established in 1972. Further creation of political 
parties continued through the end of the 1970s with The National Resistance Party (RN) 
and Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC) being established in 1975 and 1976 
respectively. These five parties, although not always of the same mind, would join forces 
in October of 1980 forming a formidable opponent to the right of El Salvador.66 
It is important to capture the spirit of the various opposing organizations formed 
by campesinos. By the 1970s, “forty years since the 1932 uprising and massacre, the left 
had tried to redress the inequities through political organization. But in the 1970s the 
politicians and their followers tired of waiting started to form guerilla armies.”67 The 
formation of various parties show the frustration among the rebels in how best to deal 
with the situation. By the time the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
was formed, the political option was gone. Violent action was an option in the fight for 
equality among campesinos. Violence had been the government’s way of dealing with 
campesinos, and since 1932, it had only become worse. By forming an alliance among 
themselves, the left assured a violent war with the right who had not let up on repressing 
the campesinos. 
The violence of the right through the use of death squads caused an environment 
which surely left an impression on those who were forced to live through the battle. A 
glimpse of what one may have seen in El Salvador during the early stages of the Civil 
War is sobering when considering, “most Salvadorans could conjure up the image of a 
dead body glimpsed on the way to school or work. Some were missing their heads. Many 
had suffered torture before their death that left them slashed or burned beyond 
recognition.”68 The Church also moved into the cross hairs of the right. 
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Some sections of the Church in El Salvador led a liberation theology movement in 
the late 1960–1970s, through small groups, which discussed biblical and church 
teachings on social justice.69 Being a vassal of the government, campesinos found that 
liberation theology provided a biblical bases for new found hope in social reform. Many 
of the priests teaching liberation theology took part in the Consejo Episcopal 
Latinoamericano conference of bishops in Medelìn Colombia that introduced a mandate 
to work on behalf of the poor in 1968.70 With the campesinos being part of the left, the 
clergy too became part of the movement. The clergy helped in organizing movements to 
establish campesino rights. While the priests never encouraged the campesinos to arm 
themselves, the right saw them as a threat and chose a slogan which said, “be patriotic, 
kill a priest.”71 The hatred of clergy in El Salvador was especially true of one archbishop. 
Archbishop Oscar Romero was originally a favorite of the oligarchs as he never 
denounced the landowners for their failure to pay a livable wage and criticized the priest 
who did speak out of campesino repression.72 The oligarchs were pleased with his 
selection as archbishop and showed it by paying for an elaborate investiture ceremony 
upon his selection.73 However, Archbishop Romero’s welcome was quickly replaced 
with hatred once he took up the fight of the poor. 
Archbishop Romero’s change of opinion originated from the government’s 
violation of human rights and increasing repression against the campesinos.74 He served 
as a voice for the voiceless poor who were painted red in the Cold War influenced Civil 
War. His views were not in accordance with the oligarchs and that meant he was part of 
the opposition. One of his pleas was for organization to be allowed as the ability to 
organize was recognized by church.75 Additionally, he encouraged the soldiers to 
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question their tactics in the killing of civilians encouraging them to disobey orders issued 
which were a violation of human rights.76 His attempt to reason with the soldiers led to 
his death the very next day. The government was not satisfied with his death so police 
shot and killed another forty mourners at his funeral and an assassination attempt caused 
the investigator of his death to flee the country.77 The Civil War was a culmination of 
repression and frustration. The United States and the Soviet Union funded parties but the 
people of El Salvador were the ones who lived through the violence. 
The United States, under President Carter came into the situation in El Salvador 
under the cause of looking to protect human rights and promote reform. The Reagan 
administration wanted a military “win” to keep the country from becoming communist 
over protecting human rights.78 The United States backed the Salvadoran right through 
the war committing “6 billion to counter what President Reagan considered a ‘textbook 
case’ of Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan aggression in the hemisphere.”79 The Guerillas 
received help to fund their fight during the Civil War too. The Guerrillas had the Soviet 
Union providing backing by way of Cuba and Nicaragua. The arms the guerrillas 
received to fight with early in the Civil War came from the Soviet bloc.80 
The Civil War of El Salvador was an intense display of violence considering the 
war was a small piece of the bigger east west conflict. The war was small but locally 
disastrous. Salvadorans experienced repression as long as they could remember and 
became mobilized, looking for a method to get past the economic, political, and social 
repression the government brought down on them. Seventy-five thousand lives were lost 
during the Civil War in El Salvador, yet the campesinos of El Salvador did not end up in 
power. Campesinos were the heart of the opposition and suffered the most casualties. The 
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result was a forced negotiation with the U.S. backed government they were fighting to 
overcome. In the end the Guerrillas “had lost their patrons in Nicaragua and the Soviet 
Union; their arms flow had dwindled, their allies were pressuring them to negotiate, and 
their civilian supports had been largely assassinated.”81 
D. CONCLUSION 
The relevance of the violence El Salvador experienced is that more than one 
million Salvadorians left their war torn country during the Civil War and came to in the 
United States.82 Most of these immigrants landed in the poorer areas of L.A. and DC.83 
MS 13’s earliest members survived the violence of the Civil War in El Salvador. Further, 
some founding members were combat veterans, fighting for both sides of the belligerents 
involved: FMLN and the government.84 These men immigrated to the United States out 
of desperation due to the condition of their country. Many soldiers also came after the 
war due to their unemployment by way of demobilization in El Salvador.85 
The suggested link, is between MS 13, FMLN, and El Salvador’s governmental 
soldiers and the legacy of violence which dates back to La Matanza in 1932. In the case 
of FMLN, El Salvador’s government soldiers, and MS 13, we are talking about violence 
perpetrated by the same person. Both governmental soldiers and members of FMLN 
immigrated to the United States. With the motivation for the earlier mentioned uprisings 
varying between participation, defiance, and pleasure in agency, it is not coincidental the 
same people who endured a violent history filled with repression formed a gang when 
repression in the United States continued. The Salvadoran immigrants were looking for a 
supportive group and the betterment of their people. They left their war torn country in 
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search of a better future and were not going to allow themselves to be oppressed, as they 
were by the Salvadoran government. The violence displayed by MS 13 stems from the 
deep roots of violence the founders and their predecessors experienced in El Salvador. 
Economically, the Salvadoran immigrants were stuck in the poverty-ridden areas 
of L.A. that provided little opportunity when put up against the Mexican immigrants who 
also occupied the area. Politically, the Salvadoran immigrants had no legal backing due 
to the United States funding the war that caused their immigration. Only two percent of 
immigrants who arrived in the first five years of the war were granted refugee status, the 
rest of the request were denied.86 
With more than a million Salvadorans immigrating to the United States, it is 
understood, that not all demobilized combatants became gang members in the United 
States. One can only speculate as to what other combatants have done in the United 
States. However, it is certain not all joined MS 13. Those who did had a violent history, 
which made them dangerous enough to become America’s most dangerous gang in a 
short period of time. 
This chapter discussed the legacy of violence that preceded and birthed the 
founding members of MS 13. The legacy of violence began in 1932 and even now shows 
no sign of slowing. Today, El Salvador is notorious for the level of violence in the 
country. The homicide rate suggests the legacy of violence that produced the originating 
members of MS 13 continues. In 2014, El Salvador had 3,192 homicides (8.74 per day)—
up 57% from the homicide rate, the now collapsed gang truce between MS 13 and their 
rival Calle 18, netted in 2013.87 In just the first six days of 2015, El Salvador experienced 
90 homicides, or 15 per day.88 That rate grew to 16 homicides per day with 677 murders 
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taking place in June alone.89 The 677 murders in June is the highest amount of killing to 
take place in the country since the Civil War, leaving a total 2,965 Salvadoran’s dead 
within the first six months of 2015.90 
The legacy of violence thus continues in El Salvador, as does the gang problem, 
which includes MS 13. Since MS 13 continues to grow in the United States and El 
Salvador it is important to understand this violence translates to the growth of MS 13 
both in El Salvador and the United States. Since their inception, MS 13 has grown 
exponentially. The following chapter will detail the pattern of their overall growth. 
Additionally, the role of the U.S. policy, demographics, and media vis-à-vis expansion of 
the MS 13 network will be discussed. 
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III. ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION OF THE MARA 
SALVATRUCHA NETWORK 
Founded in the barrios of Los Angeles in the 1980s, Mara Salvatrucha started as a 
small group of Salvadoran immigrants grouped together for protection from the Mexican 
immigrants, who inhabited the same barrios. It is reasonable to believe that the founders 
of what is known today as MS 13 would have never imagined having 70,000 members.91 
The gang is also the first street gang to be named a transnational criminal organization. 
On October 11, 2012, MS 13 became the first street gang designated as a transnational 
criminal organization by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.92 The logical question is 
how did this happen? How could a street gang grow a network large enough to warrant 
the attention of the federal government? This chapter looks to answer that question and 
will argue that in L.A., Central America, and DC-U.S. policy, demographics, and the 
media are the three factors that enabled the horizontal and vertical integration (domestic 
and transnational growth) of the MS 13 Network. 
 Each of the following sections will discuss how U.S. policy impacted the 
expansion of MS 13. U.S. domestic and foreign policies had a major effect on the gang’s 
network—specifically, the policies that aided MS 13’s growth in L.A., Central America, 
and Washington, DC. Additionally, each section will discuss how the favorable 
demographics of the areas where the gang flourished enlarged MS 13’s network. 
Specifically, the socio-economic disparity characterizing each location will be discussed. 
Finally, the role of the media though the CNN effect will be discussed—specifically, how 
the CNN effect further influenced policy, which inadvertently helped expand the gang’s 
network in each location, resulting in with the first street gang to be categorized as a 
transnational criminal organization. 
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A. ESTABLISHMENT AND GROWTH IN LOS ANGELES 
MS 13 was formed during the 1980s by Salvadorans who immigrated prior to and 
during the Salvadoran Civil War.”93 More than one million Salvadorians fled their 
country during the Civil War, heading to the United States.94 Most of these immigrants 
landed in the “already impoverished, over crowded, and gang-affected neighborhoods of 
East and South Central Los Angeles,” while others went to the greater Washington, DC 
region.95 In the gang-infested neighborhoods in L.A., the Salvadorans faced constant 
persecution by the African American and Mexican American gangs. Some Salvadoran 
immigrants were experienced combat vets, fighting for either the FMLN or the 
government.96 The end of the war led to a massive demobilization of the military in El 
Salvador, leaving many of Salvador’s combat veterans with no livelihood and with 
immigration as a rational choice.97 
Two ingredients placed the Salvadorans in a tough spot: U.S. policy and 
demographics. Demobilization after the Civil War encouraged hardened veterans to 
immigrate to the United States out of desperation brought on by the political and 
economic conditions in El Salvador. It is not coincidental that the same people who 
endured a violent history filled with repression formed a gang when repression in the 
United States continued. Salvadorans faced isolation on all fronts upon arrival to L.A. 
Landing in the poverty-ridden areas of L.A., Salvadorans faced a lack of opportunities for 
employment. Additionally, they could not seek social aid to help cope with their poverty 
since the U.S. was funding the governmental side of El Salvador’s Civil War that caused 
their immigration. Many who arrived in the first five years attempted to become citizens. 
Only two percent of those who took the legal route to citizenship were granted refugee 
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status.98 The low acceptance rate left 98% of the immigrants who were looking to do the 
right thing as immigrants with no legal rights—and the Mara Salvatrucha gang was born. 
Before Mara Salvatrucha 13 was known as MS 13, the gang was known as MSS 
or Mara Salvatrucha Stoners. Stoners would later fall off, leaving the gang to be known 
as Mara Salvatrucha. In 1993, MS saw the benefit of alliances and became MS 13 after 
forging an alliance with the Mexican Mafia or “La Eme” as it is known in places it 
dominates.99 The number 13 is a reference to the letter “m,” which is the thirteenth letter 
in the alphabet and the first letter in Mexican and Mafia. Affiliation with the Mexican 
Mafia was the first expansion of the MS 13 network. Affiliation led to alliances with 
prominent gangs in L.A., which helped further establish and expand MS 13. The Mexican 
Mafia runs street-level operations in Southern California. Use of the number 13 affirmed 
the alliance between MS 13, La Eme, and the Sureño network. The Sureño network 
includes street gangs loyal to the Mexican Mafia in Southern California.100 That same 
year, MS 13 was suspected to be committing crimes, which included trafficking drugs, 
extortion, robbery, and murder.101 While growing, MS 13 was a small part of the bigger 
gang war that was consuming the city of L.A. throughout the rocky 1990s; however, the 
police reaction to the gang problem only led to MS 13’s growth. 
Municipal policies in L.A. combined with aggressive U.S. immigration policy led 
to a reaction against the increased gang activity within L.A., placing street gang members 
into deportation proceedings during the early 1990s. The United States had strict 
deportation policies, and in L.A., through the cooperation of LAPD and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS), now known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), the number of MS 13 members being deported was deported was high.102 
Moreover, the Three Strike Law of 1994, while not a deportation centered effort, was 
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intended to “keep murders, rapists, and child molesters behind bars, where they 
belong.”103 MS13 and other Sureños found themselves in some of the targeted categories. 
In 1996, the federal government introduced legislation targeted at MS 13 by way of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IRIRA).104 The IRIRA 
made felonies of what used to be considered misdemeanors, criminalizing nonviolent 
actions that were previously menial- like petty theft.105 The criminalization of minor 
infractions made illegal and legal immigrants easy targets for law enforcement official 
who were looking for a reason to deport them. 
By 1996, the Civil War in El Salvador ended and the United States favored 
deportation as the solution to the perceived imported problem of MS 13.106 Between 1996 
and 2004, the annual number of deported Central Americans tripled from 8,057 to 
24,285, respectively.107 Along with deportations, another factor that compounded the 
growth was the thousands of gang members released after being arrested in the early 
1990s and serving their sentences.108 Some of these released MS 13 members were 
deported upon release, but others fed back into their communities in L.A..109 MS 13 gang 
members, who experienced the prison system were released back out on the streets. The 
danger associated with the release of these gang members comes from the networking 
experience gained from prison gangs that run multiple street-level gangs. 
U.S. policy, which helped fund the government side of the Salvadoran Civil War 
abroad and domestically, used deportations as a method of dealing with MS 13 gang 
members created a balloon effect. The law enforcement squeeze that took place in L.A. 
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caused an inflation of gang members arriving in Central America. The U.S. - sponsored 
one way trips for gang members, served as a network expansion for MS 13. Immigration 
figures of the mid-1990s show that “40,000 criminal illegal immigrants — some of whom 
were experienced, U.S.-’trained’” gang members—were repatriated to Central America  
annually.110 A direct result of the mass repatriation of these previously convicted 
immigrants was that “Central American countries experienced an unprecedented growth 
of street gangs and violence” during that period.111 It is important to remember that the 
increased street gang violence of the mid 1990s was more of a continuation of violence 
that was present during the Civil War, which ended in 1992. 
The Civil War left El Salvadorans reeling from their traumatic experiences. 
Directly after the war, the country had little to offer those who survived in terms of 
employment much less the influx of repatriated Salvadorans. The Salvadorans who were 
repatriated faced a similar atmosphere vis-à-vis demographics that they found in L.A. 
The unemployment rate in El Salvador reached 7.97 in 1996—the highest ever—after the 
influx of repatriated Salvadorans arrived from L.A.112 The effects of U.S. immigration 
policy thus played a significant role in the network expansion of the MS 13 from L.A. to 
Central America. By placing repatriated gang members in the unfavorable demographics 
of a country that just endured a Civil War, the MS 13 network was able to grow 
exponentially. The glaring absence in the initial expansion of MS 13 was the media 
coverage present during the further expansion of the gang. 
The media was not as prevalent in their coverage of MS 13 during the 1990s, they 
were more focused on the bigger systemic gang problem that engulfed Los Angeles. L.A. 
represents an interesting case of the CNN effect due to the amount of gang activity 
consuming the area during the late  1980s and 90s. The influence of the media was 
indirect and geared towards the bigger immigration and gang issues. The bigger deal in 
the media was Rodney King and L.A.’s reaction to his beating. Due to the consuming 
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nature of the riots in 1992 and all the other gang activity, the anti- gang effort vis-à-vis 
MS 13 was relatively minor. A search in “Nexis” shows that from 1990–94 there were 
only four news stories that covered “Mara Salvatrucha.”113 Media coverage focused more 
on the overall gang problem and not the mass MS 13 deportations taking place. When the 
immigration reform legislation took effect in 1996 only 17 items of news media were 
about “Mara Salvatrucha.”114 
In terms of media coverage the CNN effect focused on the overall gang problem. 
Violent images of gangs led the public to push for tough anti-gang policy. Policy arrived 
in the form of the three strikes legislation and the immigration reform act of 1996 
previously mentioned. Three strikes legislation made it mandatory for any criminal 
charged with more than one individual felony would serve double time for the second and 
25 years to life for the third. These policies were not MS 13 centric even though the 
effects led to the growth of MS 13 through the deportation of MS 13 members to Central 
America. While the gang violence consuming L.A. led to an anti-gang uproar, the CNN 
effect had unforeseen consequences as those very anti-gang policies led to more gangs—
both in L.A. and in Central America. 
B. CENTRAL AMERICA 
Of all three sections in this chapter, Central America can attribute the majority of 
the growth of MS 13’s to U.S. policy. As the deportations continued, Central American 
countries experienced an unprecedented growth of street gangs and violence.115 The 
deportations of MS 13 members allowed for American-influenced gang members and 
newly found gang practices to infiltrate a war torn country. MS 13 did not represent the 
first gangs of El Salvador, street gangs were present there as early as 1963.116 MS 13 
members did introduce a more structured, violent, identifiable gang for which adult 
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responsibilities did not qualify as a reason for separation.117 Membership into MS 13 
meant a lifelong commitment. 
MS 13 was established in San Salvador by 1992, by way of “clicas (cliques, cells, 
or groups) deported from the United States and replacing earlier, less violent, and less 
sophisticated gangs.”118 Once established in El Salvador, gang members then immigrate 
back to the United States causing what Jose Miguel Cruz called the Boomerang effect; 
many times reentry of MS 13 members is paid for by the various trafficking 
businesses.119 Deportations along with migration for work by El Salvadoran immigrants 
led to a large number of cliques being established around the United States and in Central 
America. These cliques of gang members identified with MS 13. Since the Civil war did 
not end all the violence, just like in L.A., “some youth joined gangs as a way to deal with 
the violence affecting their communities.”120 U.S. immigration policy landed repatriated 
gangsters in areas prime for recruitment. The demographics of the areas gangsters 
returned to in El Salvador lacked options for security and economic survival outside of 
MS 13. Recruitment is easy when there are not many options available for employment 
and survival. MS 13 provided both protection from the continued violence and a means 
of employment for the poor in the areas they inhabited.121 
The demographics of the repatriated gangsters who returned from the U.S. to El 
Salvador were favorable to the expansion of the MS 13 network. El Salvador as a whole 
did not offer much in the way of employment nor protection from the growing gang 
problem.122 Repatriated Salvadorans were poor, as were those whom welcomed them 
home in El Salvador. With little else to provide a steady income, the market for recruits 
was expanding by the planeload in El Salvador. MS 13 represented a way out for many 
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who idolized the new culture that the American influenced gang members brought with 
them. Poor Salvadorans faced a life filled with the possibility of violence and extreme 
poverty. MS 13 represented a safety net to rely on for protection from the violence and a 
potential to escape poverty through illicit activity. 
By the early 21st century, the upswing of criminals coming courtesy of U.S. 
foreign policy led to pressure in solving the gang pandemic that originated in L.A. and 
was now in Central America. Many gang members, some of whom grew up in the states, 
were sent to Central America causing an emergence of MS 13 clicas that mimicked 
southern California Chicano Gangs.123 MS 13 had a solid foothold in L.A. and was 
establishing one in Central America. Central America’s reaction to MS 13 was a U.S. 
backed policy named Mano Dura. The U.S. worked with the Nationalist Republican 
Alliance Governments (ARENA) of the 1990–2000s and saw them as a reliable 
ally.124ARENA’s aggressive, law enforcement centered approach to dealing with gangs 
would prove to be an abusive policy.125 Mano Dura “favored area sweeps and mass 
detentions, while Honduras and El Salvador also adopted anti-gang legislation that 
sanctioned the arrest and prosecution of suspected gang members for their physical 
appearance alone.”126 As the push to quell gang violence in El Salvador grew politicians 
began to capitalize on the public fear. Additionally, Central American Media provided 
the public with a definition for MS 13’s physical appearance and pushed for Mano Dura 
as the solution for the problem. 
Central America presents a clear case of the CNN effect. Sonja Wolf identified 
the CNN effect in Central America, saying, “media depictions influence citizen views of 
crime and narrow the choice of policy options people are inclined to support.”127 The 
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media engaged in some strategic communication on behalf of the elite, influencing the 
masses toward a favorable sentiment to fulfill the mission of the elite and pass Mano 
Dura legislation. The media used dehumanizing lexicon consistent with the description of 
MS 13 as animals, allowing the government to be the hunters of those animals.128 Wolf 
identifies some key issues concerning the bias current media has in favor of the rich 
indicating that objective media reporting simply cannot afford to report.129 She argues 
that the media simply ignored the community aspect of reporting on the gangs instead 
focusing on the criminal, savage aspects associated with the gang.130  
The media engaged in some strategic communication on behalf of the elite, 
influencing the masses toward a favorable sentiment to fulfill the mission of the elite and 
pass Mano Dura legislation. The Central American CNN effect caused unforeseen 
consequences that ultimately led to a stronghold formed in the prisons of Central 
America. The media’s portrayal of the good being the politicians and the bad security 
threat being MS 13 led, to the implementation of Mano Dura by President Francisco 
Flores in 2003.131 Mano Dura helped create a stronghold of MS 13 in Central America 
through the mass incarcerations and adaptations to the policy itself. The transformation of 
MS 13 in response to Mano Dura policy was one of the unforeseen consequence. In an 
effort to avoid detection and subsequent incarceration under Mano Dura policies, MS 13 
instituted a toughening of entry requirements, a restriction on the consumption of drugs, 
an increase in the use of firearms, a reduction in visible tattoos, encouragement to 
disperse in the region, and making the MS 13 prisons the command centers.132 The 
aggressive approach by ARENA in El Salvador led to a united, stronger MS13 network, 
which now had motivation to stick together in the prisons and in society as they were 
being targeted by the strict Mano Dura policies. 
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In Central America, the consequences of U.S. immigration policy, demographics, 
and the CNN effect all aided the expansion of the MS 13 network. Like L.A., Central 
America presented favorable demographics for the expansion of the MS 13 network. 
After U.S. policy landed repatriated gang members in recruitment friendly demographics, 
the gang grew quickly. Media portrayal of the gang as animals, aided in uniting the gang 
for self-preservation and led to practices which attempt to make the affiliation of 
individual members ambiguous to police. While not as extreme as the war torn Central 
America, the further expansion of the MS 13’s network due to policy, demographics and 
CNN effect can also be seen in the DC region. 
C. WASHINGTON, DC, REGION 
Starting with demographics, according to the 2010 census, 1.7 million 
Salvadoran’s can be found in the United States—most being in Los Angeles and the 
Washington, DC region.133 The consistent growth of the Hispanic community in DC 
presents interesting facts about the growth of MS 13. Connie McGuire uses U.S. census 
data to depict the demographics of DC highlighting the 19.4 rise in the Hispanic 
population from 2000–03.134 Further she notes that DC and inner counties there have 
neighborhoods that are 30–50 percent Hispanic, with half of the people in DC being from 
Central America and 31 percent from El Salvador.135 
Presented with a different scene, the Salvadoran immigrants that arrived in DC 
did not have to contest with a large Mexican population like that of L.A. McGuire 
discusses how unreliable statistics and extensive media attention increase the difficulty of 
accurately assessing the presence of Central American gangs in the DC area. 
Additionally, the anti-immigration sentiment that took hold in DC after 9/11 further 
influenced the hostility towards MS 13’. The irony in this is that McGuire says the 
Bloods and Crips were more of a threat in the area than MS 13. DC was known as the 
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murder capital of the United States from the 1980s to the 1990s, accounting for over 500 
murders a year.136 McGuire asserts, “while there are cases of Central American gangs 
attacking random citizens, the overwhelming majority of their crimes are perpetuated 
against rival gangs, or against other Latinos in their communities.”137 Yet, DC, after the 
Brenda Paz murder, was the place most policy against MS 13 originated. 
The Brenda Paz case serves as the best example of the CNN effect in the U.S. as 
most anti-gang policies originated after this trial took place. The effect of U.S. policy on 
MS 13 in DC was substantial after the murder of Brenda Paz. Brenda was a 17-year-old 
Salvadorian born gangster turned informant who was killed while seven months pregnant 
the morning after spending the night with her killer. The weapon of Choice—a machete. 
The murder took place in 2003. The trial for her murder took place in 2005. 
Coincidentally, 2005 marked the beginning of the onslaught of anti-gang policy 
aimed at MS 13. That year alone, the FBI formed a task force targeting MS 13, the 
National Gang Intelligence center was created, and Operation Community Shield was 
implemented by Immigration and Customs Enforcement; enabling ICE officers to work 
with foreign official to prosecute transnational street gangs, or MS 13. The following 
year, (2006) the FBI named MS 13 the most dangerous street gang in America.138 In 
2012, MS 13 became the first street gang to be named a transnational criminal 
organization.139 
The Murder of Brenda Paz was horrific. However, gruesome murders happen, 
what doesn’t normally happen is a federal level reaction to a problem that has a street 
gang capacity. The media continued to portray a glamorized version of MS 13 since the 
Brenda Paz trial in 2005. Coverage of her actual murder was not at all sensational. From 
January 2003 through January 2005 “Nexis” indicates there were 372 items of news 
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pertaining to MS 13 with 172 sources reporting.140 Per “Nexis,” 2005 had four times 
more items of news with 2138 and 192 different source reporting.141 Media coverage 
during the trial assessed MS 13 as a transnational gang that was worthy of national 
attention—which it got. However, the accuracy of the assessment is questionable. 
The language used to describe the gang is very different in L.A. where it 
originated and in DC where the murder of Brenda Paz occurred. A reading of the .L.A. 
Times blog conveys a very different description of MS 13 than the Department of the 
Treasury’s press release. The L.A. Times blog is titled, “In a first, U.S. labels MS 13 
street gang Criminal Organization.”142 The Department of the Treasury’s press release is 
titled “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization.”143 The title gives 
insight into framing by the media to influence the reader in a manner only the media can. 
Instead of recognizing that MS 13 originated in L.A. and only expanded after one-way 
trips to El Salvador were provided for incarcerated gang members in accordance with 
U.S. policy; MS 13 is described as a Latin American Criminal organization. When the 
media influences the public, pushing the public to press the government for particular 
policy—this is when the CNN effect takes place. 
The effect of MS 13 media coverage is proven to be significant when one looks at 
the policy enacted after 2005. In 2005 Coverage of MS 13 exceeded any years prior and 
has exceeded every year since. Scholars such as Sonja Wolf and Connie McGuire 
highlight the sensationalization of MS 13 by the media. The media picked a target and 
convinced the people, including members of Congress who reside in the area that MS 13 
was the most dangerous gang in the country. The rise in coverage of MS 13 in the DC 
region brought up a subject that previously could not be found on the agenda of 
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Congress.144 McGuire points out, the murder rate in 2005 DC was not even half of what 
it was in 1991; prior to MS 13’s presence. It is hard to dismiss the role the media had in 
the growth of MS 13. Even President Bush mentioned youth gangs in his 2005 State of 
the Union Address.145 Since the Brenda Paz trial various documentaries have further 
continued the glamorization of the Gang. The most popular being a National Geographic 
documentary narrated by Lisa Ling entitled MS 13: The World’s Most Dangerous Gang. 
D. CONCLUSION 
MS 13’s network has grown substantially, especially in areas where a high 
concentration of Salvadoran immigrants contend with other Latin American immigrants. 
However, not all the growth has been due to organic strategy. U.S. Policy, demographics, 
and the CNN effect have all contributed to the growth of MS 13. Without domestic policy 
pushing MS 13 members to El Salvador, their growth may have never reached the level it 
has today. Further, without U.S. backed policies like Mano Dura that mimic our own law 
enforcement centric policies, the gang may have never been able to organize itself the 
way it has. Lastly, for every documentary produced there are MS 13 members ready to 
talk about their gang activities. MS 13 has capitalized on its glamorization and taken to 
social media and YouTube to communicate with sympathizers, using both music and 
videos. In fact, a simple “MS 13” search on YouTube returns over a million hits.146 It is 
unlikely that a gang would dedicate the time necessary to produce music and videos 
without receiving an incentive—in this case growth. The 2013 National gang report 
provided by the National Gang Intelligence Center states that MS 13 has partnerships 
with Los Zetas Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Sinaloa cartel, and La Familia Michoacãna cartel.147 
In 2014, MS 13 expanded its network across the United States by becoming active in 
forty-two states and the District of Columbia.148 Since their establishment in L.A., MS 13 
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has been able to recruit ten thousand members nationwide and has received a lot of 
attention due to their portrayal in the media.149 Coverage offers exposure, and one must 
question if the media’s glamorization deters or promotes a potential gang member to join 
the MS 13 Ranks? Having grown up in gang-infested neighborhoods, the author suggests 
exposure only helps recruitment efforts. 
MS 13 shows no sign of slowing the expansion of their network. However, in 
order for an accurate response to the growing MS 13 threat, an accurate depiction of the 
gang must be presented. Sensationalization will only lead to more growth as the Latin 
demographic mentioned by both Sonja Wolf and Connie McGuire is growing in the 
United States. Illegal immigration is a hot button issue today as it was when MS 13 was 
established. The anti-immigration sentiment after 9/11 may have caused isolation of the 
Hispanic population, leading to the growth of MS 13. Furthermore, it is evident that the 
media’s portrayal of gangs has not been to the benefit of society. U.S. policies that 
stemmed from events in L.A., Central America, and DC such as the Illegal Immigration 
reform, Mano Dura, and MS 13 being named a transnational criminal organization, all 
worked to unite and grow the MS 13 brand. Today, clicas all over the United States take 
pride in being part of the bigger MS 13 network that has a national presence. The brutal 
images displayed in most stories have generated the perception of MS 13 as the most 
dangerous gang in America. While the brutal representation of the gangs can be 
beneficial in helping to “focus attention on the problem, these benefits do not 
outweighing the cost of glamorization.”150 After all, glamorization and policies driven by 
the CNN effect in the United States and Central America led to the first transnational 
street gang. 
The background this chapter provides on the horizontal and vertical expansion of 
the MS 13 network by way of U.S. Policy, demographics, and the CNN effect will be 
helpful in analyzing the level of threat MS 13’s current criminal network presents to the 
state of Texas. An analysis of MS 13’s networks within Texas will be followed by 
recommendations for action based off the actions of L.A., Central America, and DC region.  
                                                 
149 National Gang Intelligence Center, 2013 National Gang Report. 
150 McGuire, “Working Paper on Central American Youth Gangs,” 29. 
 43 
IV. TEXAS 
Building from the data provided in the previous three chapters, this chapter will 
combine relevant data from established strongholds to define the MS 13 network, 
highlighting its presence in cities across the State of Texas. The horizontal relationships 
of the gang within the state will be discussed as will the current vertical transnational 
relationships. Additionally, the relevance of highway corridors to horizontal and vertical 
relationships of the gang will be addressed. Details of these relationships will provide an 
accurate account of the networks currently utilized by MS 13 in Texas. Potential 
expansion on both the horizontal and vertical levels will be discussed using data 
pertaining to known associates of the gang. New street gangs and transnational cartels 
will be introduced to represent the horizontal and vertical integration being used for this 
expansion. Moreover, U.S. immigration policy, demographics, and the CNN effect 
visible in L.A., Central America, and the DC region will be discussed as applicable to 
Texas. All three topics continue to be relevant to the horizontal and vertical integration of 
the MS 13 Network. 
The process to be used in defining the Texas Network of MS 13 will consist of 
three distinct sections. Section one will discuss known horizontal integration by using 
information gathered throughout the FBI’s use of Brenda Paz and other open source 
reporting. Section two will discuss the vertical integration of the gang by using its known 
relationships with transnational cartels. Once MS 13’s horizontal and vertical 
integration/network expansion in Texas is identified, section three will provide an 
explanation of the role highway corridors play in its expansion and analyze the threat the 
defined networks present to the state. Like the previous chapters, the expansion of MS 
13’s network will be viewed through the lens of U.S. policy, demographics and CNN 
effect with a concentration on the effect each had on growth. Additionally, proximity vis-
à-vis transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the border, and South and West, Texas 
will be addressed to discuss MS 13’s network expansion. 
Proximity is an important factor as Mexico is in a well-documented Narco-war 
and has been for some time. Cartels such as Los Zetas, Gulf, Sinaloa, and La Familia 
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Michoacãn are all based in Mexico and have a known presence in Texas.151 Furthermore, 
with La Bestia presenting a well-known transit option for immigrants fleeing the violence 
of the Central American narco-war and criminals alike, Texas’ significance in the bigger 
picture of transnational criminality needs to be addressed. 
A. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION OF MS 13’S NETWORK 
The horizontal integration of MS 13 is made clear throughout the interviews 
provided by Brenda Paz after her arrest. In Samuel Logan’s This Is for the Mara 
Salvatrucha, Logan uses Paz’s FBI interviews to show how Brenda first encountered the 
gang in Texas.152 The beginning of Logan’s book is focused on Carrolton, Texas, a 
suburb of Dallas where Brenda joined MS 13. Houston is also included in the book as is 
the bigger network that the Texas cliques have access to.153 When speaking to detectives 
about the movement of girls who work for MS 13, Paz details how the network Texas is 
included in reaches Colorado, Virginia, Idaho, Las Vegas, L.A., Oklahoma, and North 
Carolina.154 It is important to note that this information originates from a female member 
of a small clique that is based outside Dallas. There are much larger cliques throughout 
the state that may have more knowledge of MS 13’ activity in Texas. 
Figure 1, was generated by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) 
depicting the current MS 13 presence within the state. 
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Figure 1.  Tier 2: Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13) 
From Texas Department of Public Safety, “Tier 2: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),” image, 
Gang Threat Assessment (Austin, TX: Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014), 33, 
http://www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff/media_and_communications/2014/txGangThreat
Assessment.pdf. 
Figure 1 shows there are high levels of MS 13 gang activity in Houston, 
Dallas/Fort Worth, Corpus Christi, El Paso, and San Antonio. The darkest areas represent 
the highest level of activity. On this map, the darkest areas are in the Houston, 
Dallas/Fort Worth, and Corpus Christi areas. Figure 2, allows for a comparison of the 
major interstates in Texas and MS 13 activity. 
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Figure 2.  Side-by-side comparison of the major highways/interstates in Texas 
and MS 13 activity 
Map on left is from TourTexas.com, “Texas Maps: Major Texas Highways/Interstates,” 
image, 1996, http://www.tourtexas.com/texas_maps_highways.cfm, map on right is from 
Texas Department of Public Safety, Gang Threat Assessment, (Austin, TX: Texas 
Department of Public Safety, 2014), 33, http://www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff /media 
_and_communications/2014/txGangThreatAssessment.pdf. 
Figure 2 suggest that MS 13’s activity is centered on areas that offer major 
corridors to get in and out. In particular, the Interstate Highways (IHs) 10 and 35 routes, 
which run from El Paso to Houston and the Rio Grande Valley to Dallas, respectively, 
seem to have the most activity. IH-10 has activity in El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston. 
IH-35 has activity in Laredo, San Antonio, and Dallas. Corpus Christi, a highly active 
MS 13 city, is the only active city along IH-37. However, IH-37 is a direct route from 
Corpus Christi to San Antonio, which has both IH-10 and IH-35 within the city. This 
allows San Antonio to be the biggest city that is not at the highest level of activity and the 
link between all of the current cities with the highest level of activity. This is good news 
for MS 13 and bad news for law enforcement because San Antonio’s ZIP codes with the 
highest level of poverty are in the predominantly Hispanic inner west and south side of 
the city.155 With poverty being the highest in these areas, the demographics are favorable 
155 Tyler White, “San Antonio’s High-poverty ZIP Codes Fall Closer to Downtown, South Bexar 
County,” mySA, December 29, 2014, http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/San-Antonio-s-
high-poverty-ZIP-codes-fall-5980210.php#photo-7317370. 
 47 
for MS 13 recruitment. Demographics of every area where MS 13 is active are worthy of 
review. 
The demographics of both El Paso and San Antonio show they have a larger 
Hispanic population than the three cities with the highest level of activity. El Paso is the 
sixth largest city in Texas and has an eighty-nine percent Hispanic population. San 
Antonio is the second largest city in Texas and has a sixty-three percent Hispanic 
population. In comparison, both of these cities have a higher Hispanic population than the 
forty-nine percent of Los Angeles, where the gang originated.156 
There is a link between demographics and U.S. immigration policy in Texas. 
Once immigrants make it into the United States by way of Mexico, Texas is a landing 
spot for many. This is because, “the Texas-Mexico border makes up 1,254 miles of the 
1,900-mile-long U.S.-Mexico border.”157 The response to illegal immigration, at least 
since as early as 2006, has been militarization by way of an increased border patrol 
presence and the use of National Guard troops.158 Presidents George W. Bush and 
Barack Obama and Governor Rick Perry have ordered forces to the border to help quell 
illegal immigration.159 Further, armed militias have taken it upon themselves to patrol the 
Texas- Mexico border to help prevent illegal immigration.160 
The militarization of the border may have unintended consequences on the 
immigrants who cross illegally and make it into Texas. The Border Patrol repeatedly 
reports that along with ordinary immigrants, criminals and gang members are also being 
apprehended. This is important because gang members who do not get caught have 
known networks in Texas that normally lie in poverty-ridden areas that offer little in the 
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way of employment opportunities. Like the Salvadoran immigrants who landed in L.A., 
the ordinary immigrants of today are looking for a way to provide for their families. 
When MS 13 becomes an option, being an illegal immigrant becomes a secondary 
concern to the effects that gang membership will have on the individual and the 
surrounding community. Samuel Logan referred to MS 13 as being “as fluid as the labor 
market that attracted Latino immigrants. Wherever there was a Latino community, the 
MS burrowed in and thrived.”161 This is concerning when one thinks back to the CNN 
effect, which initially enabled MS 13 to grow. The immigrants come from Central 
America and the Rio Grande Valley is where the most are being apprehended.162 The Rio 
Grande Valley is a prime spot for expansion of MS 13 through its known alliances. 
The alliances of MS 13 present a threat to the state as a whole in that network 
expansion is readily available. Shortly after organizing in Los Angeles, MS 13 began to 
build alliances. MS 13’s relationships with the Mexican Mafia and Sureño 13 are worth 
review since both are present in the state of Texas. The Texas Gang Threat Assessment of 
2014 has the DPS dividing Texas into six regions. The division is done to provide an 
assessment of the most significant gangs in each region. Of the six regions, one and two 
include the larger cities of Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston, respectively—MS 13 has a 
significant presence in both regions.163 The additional four regions have listed associates 
of MS 13, like Sureño 13, as having a significant presence in each of them.164 With the 
Mexican Mafia having significant reach in Texas, as they do in California, the expected 
continuance of the alliance formed by both gangs would not be an unreasonable 
hypothesis. The number of Sureño 13 members leaving California and coming to Texas 
to avoid the Three Strikes Law continues to grow. El Paso has seen a significant increase 
in the amount of Sureño 13 members per the 2014 Texas Gang Threat Assessment. These 
Sureño 13 members have a familiarity to MS 13 that dates back to the early 1990s and 
could suggest an expansion of the MS 13 Network via the interstate corridors. 
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B. VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF MS 13’S NETWORK 
The transnational element of MS13 is a significant concern for the state of Texas. 
MS 13 currently has a partnership with various TCO’s. The 2013 National Gang Report 
provided by the National Gang Intelligence Center has MS 13 in partnerships with Los 
Zetas, Gulf, Sinaloa, and La Familia Michoacãn cartels.165 All four cartels listed are 
actively operating in Texas.166 Furthermore, in Texas’s three-tier rating of gangs, the 
most significant gang threats are considered to be a tier one threat. The tiers are 
constructed by analyzing eleven factors to determine an appropriate threat level 
associated with each gang.167 MS 13 rose from a level-three to a level-two threat from 
2012 to 2013.168 This is significant when one considers that the weights used to calculate 
risk include “relationship with cartels, transnational criminal activity, level of criminal 
activity, level of violence, prevalence throughout Texas, relationships with other gangs, 
total strength, statewide organizational effectiveness, juvenile membership, threat to law 
enforcement, and involvement in human smuggling and trafficking.”169 Should MS 13 
rise from a tier two to a tier one gang, its vertical integration will likely be a primary 
justification for the elevated risk. The DPS speaks to this transnational threat posed by 
MS 13 by saying, 
The Mexican cartels are the most significant organized crime threat to 
Texas, with six of the eight cartels having command and control networks 
operating in the state and using it as a transshipment center for the 
movement of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and people 
into and throughout Texas and the nation, and transporting bulk cash, 
weapons, and stolen vehicles back to Mexico. 
The second most significant organized crime threat in Texas is the 
existence of state-wide prison gangs, many of whom now work directly 
with the Mexican cartels, gaining substantial profits from drug and human 
trafficking, including prostitution. Prison gangs operate within and outside 
of prison and are responsible for a disproportionate amount of violent 
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crime. With access to the large profits from drug and human trafficking, 
they are less dependent upon robberies, burglaries, and larcenies as a 
source of income.170 
With MS 13 having a documented reach of a TCO and being affiliated with the 
Mexican Mafia prison gang since its infancy, the risk of further vertical integration is 
real. Figure 3 details the “smuggling and trafficking routes into and through Texas.”171 
Figure 3.  Smuggling and traffic routes into and through Texas 
 
From Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Public Safety Threat Overview,” 
Smuggling and Trafficking Routes Into and Through Texas,” (Austin, TX: Texas 
Department of Public Safety, 2013), 10, http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/ 
media_and_communications/threatOverview.pdf. 
Figure 3, provides a vivid depiction of how Texas serves as the gateway for 
human smuggling and drug trafficking that originates from countries to the south. With 
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various cartels being active in Texas, it is important to identify the biggest threat to the 
state because the cartel that controls the majority of the border is likely the best option for 
MS 13’s quest to vertically extend its network. Figure 4, provides insight into which 
cartels run the border regions of Texas. 
Figure 4 shows that Zetas control the majority of the Southwest region of the 
border. The Sinaloa Cartel controls the eastern region of Texas, after overrunning the 
Juarez Cartel in Cuidad Juarez, which borders El Paso.172 The overtaking of Juarez also 
enabled the Sureño 13 gang, which is a close associate of MS 13 through their bond to 
the Mexican Mafia prison gang, to set up a working relationship with the Sinaloa 
Cartel.173 
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Figure 4.  Map of drug trafficking organization (DTO) areas of dominant 
influence in Mexico by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
 
From June S. Beittel, image, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and 
Scope of the Violence “Map of DTO Areas of Dominant Influence by the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (2013),” (CRS Report No. R41576) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2013), 14, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. 
By being linked to other TCO’s such as the Zetas and Sinaloa Cartels, MS 13 
gains notoriety among aspiring gangsters. Media coverage of high profile cases including 
MS 13 are not hard to find. The continual display of violence being reported and shown 
on television creates a reputation that precedes MS 13. Additionally, the Zetas are an 
ultra-violent cartel and the relationship between MS 13 and Zetas extends well past Texas 
and Mexico. A congressional research service report from May of 2015 notes that, “drug-
trafficking organizations, including Mexican groups such as Los Zetas, have increased 
their illicit activities in El Salvador, including money laundering, albeit to a lesser extent 
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than in Honduras and Guatemala.”174 This places the TCO with the largest influence in 
South West Texas together in Texas, Mexico, and Central America. 
Los Zetas of Mexico, commonly referred to as simply Zetas, were birthed as the 
muscle of Osiel Cárdenas Guillèn, a former head of the Gulf Cartel.175 Stemming from a 
pre-existing relationship with his confidant Guzmàn Decena, a former lieutenant in the 
Mexican Airborne Special Forces Group (GAFES), Osiel birthed a security detail 
consisting of prior military Special Forces.176 The ability of Osiel and his confidant to 
lure elite members of the military over stemmed from the low morale and unfavorable 
circumstances that encompassed military service in Mexico.177 Unfavorable 
circumstances included but were not limited to “measly pay, long hours, deplorable food 
and housing, harsh and arbitrary discipline, and low morale; meanwhile, rank-and-file 
fighting men watched as senior officers used their position to steal from the government 
and integrate themselves with crime chiefs.”178 
The group did not limit itself to solely Mexican defectors of the military; 
Guatemalan defectors too joined to take advantage of the opportunity for advancement 
and compensation valued at “more than six times the amount they received from the 
military.”179 The capabilities of Osiel’s security detail resulted in successes that led them 
to continually acquire new responsibilities. On top of providing security Los Zetas, the 
Zetas began to use their skills to keep trafficking lanes open, maintain order within the 
Gulf Cartel, and executed obstacles to the cartels success.180 The Zetas working under 
Osiel were able to obtain support from various gangs by the late 90s one of which was 
                                                 
174 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, 8. 
175 George W. Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, 





179 Ibid., 7. 
180 Ibid., 9. 
 54 
the Mexican Mafia (La Eme).181 The growth and influence of the Zetas paralleled the rise 
in conflict between the feuding Sinaloa and Gulf cartel. When the feuding bosses realized 
their infighting was consuming their business of trafficking and called a truce, the Zeta 
leadership voted to accept the truce and separate from the Gulf cartel—using Osiel’s 
networks to establish the Zetas we know today.182 
While the Zetas are a Mexican Cartel, their influence in greatly linked to the 
prohibition of narcotics by the U.S. The U.S. war on drugs has used Mexico as a great 
stage for various failed policies. Policies such as the Mèrida Initiative, which aim to 
enhance citizen security and target cartels and trafficking, have been far from successful. 
One of the main reasons for the failure is the lack of buy-in at all levels. Mexico has 
taken the law enforcement focused approach to dealing with their cartels and in turn they 
have prisons currently using preventative detention for suspects of organized crime—this 
leaves suspects incarcerated for up to 40 days void of legal counsel.183 While U.S. 
backed policies like the Mèrida Initiative have looked to correct this problem, it seems as 
if problems were accentuated with the funding that came from the United States. In 
addition to failed drug policies, non-related policies such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provided criminals with access to global systems for illicit 
activity.184 The unintended consequences of NAFTA combined with a failed war on 
drugs created many issues for Mexico. 
One of the major issues that has emerged is the internal level of corruption. It is 
true that corruption is no secret in Mexico. An example of the corruption within the 
prison system is seen when a vetting of police officer in late 2014 yielded 18,000 
municipal and 20,000 state police failing their vetting exams.185 Zetas can make use of 
this information and capitalize on the information exposed when corruption is trying to 
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be stomped out due to the overwhelming failure of such policies. Additionally, the 
incarceration of Zetas or even Zetitas (young Zetas) only further incorporates these 
members as in prison, being a Zeta is a form of security from all the other gangs and 
cartel members who are incarcerated. The growing prison size only lessens the security of 
each prisoner leaving illicit activity a stable environment to expand. The Zetas ability to 
capitalize on the prisons inability to thwart criminal activity was exposed through Osiel’s 
ability to call shots after his incarceration.186 In addition to using U.S. backed foreign 
policy and integral corruption to expand their brand, the Zetas have been able to 
systematically employ violence to gain influence and control of territories they want to 
claim. 
The Zetas are no strangers to violence—violence is what made them who they 
are. As prior Special Forces military members the Zetas have an advantage in tactics and 
procedures to eliminate targets. Another ability that has proven to be beneficial to the 
Zetas is their member’s ability to eliminating threats. Countless reportings of their 
violence can be found in the areas of Mexico and the United States that they occupy. 
Multiple images can be seen of the Zetas handy work, where they leave messages for 
feuding cartels on paper or bodies.187 Violence has been at the core of the Zetas efforts 
and will continue to be as it is who they are. What more can one expect from special 
operators that multiple governments trained to execute enemies? While the level of 
violence exhibited by Zetas is consistently higher than that of MS13 both TCO’s use 
violence as a means of communication. This was seen when these two organizations 
began to feud over a group of trains better known as La Bestia, which travels through 
Mexico and offers a method of transit for Central Americans looking to immigrate to the 
United States. 
La Bestia is a Spanish nickname given to the trains that travel from the 
Guatemalan-Mexico border region to the Mexico-U.S. border region. The cargo trains 
have become a notorious choice for a large amount of immigrants looking to get out of 
Central America. Immigrants can choose to coordinate their own route or employ a 
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smuggler who is familiar with available routes. MS 13 had exclusive control of the route 
until 2010 when the Zetas attempted to overtake what had proven to be a lucrative route 
for MS 13.188 After each TCO murdered the other’s men for a time period spanning 
several months; each TCO decided that half of the route was a fair compromise to stop 
the war that was going on resulting in “MS 13 taxing the Southern part of the route and 
the Zetas taxing the northern section.”189 This MS 13 joint venture poses a major risk to 
Texas due to the mutual presence of both of these TCO’s in Central America, Mexico, 
and the United States. With various drop points along the border, and others outside of 
Texas, this Zeta-MS 13 vertical network poses a huge threat to the state of Texas. Figure 
5, illustrates the routes the Zeta-MS 13 partnership dominates. 
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Figure 5.  Train routes used by Central American migrants in Mexico 
 
From Martin Gabriel Barrón Cruz, La Bestia: La Tenue Línea Entre la Migración y la 
Trata de Personas (The Beast: The Fine Line between Migration and Human Trafficking) 
(Mexico: National Institute of Penal Sciences, 2013), 18, http://www.inacipe.gob.mx/ 
stories/publicaciones/temas_selectos/LaBestia.pdf. 
The various options as to crossing points into the United States are described in 
Figure 6. Each route is given a color to depict the route used to reach a certain region. 
The color, route, and region set up in the map below are as follows: pink–Gulf Route, Rio 
Grande Valley and Eastern Texas; green–Pacific Route, Arizona and California; blue–
Center Route, Western Texas and New Mexico.190 
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Figure 6.  Train routes by intended entry point to the United States 
 
After El Informador, “Migrantes Eligen la Ruta del Pacifico (Empowering Migrants 
Pacific Route),” May 23, 2011, http://www.informador.com.mx/primera/2011/294583/ 
6/migrantes-eligen-ruta-del-pacifico.htm. 
La Bestia is a Mexico based operation. Most immigrants from Central American 
countries must first make it to the Guatemala - Mexico border to board the train and 
further risk their lives to reach the United States. An excerpt from a woman who made 
the journey is provided below to further display the capacity of the Zeta-MS 13 union. 
Navarro said she and her family rode a bus to Guatemala, crossed the 
border into Mexico, hopped on several non-passenger trains along the 
“Bestia” route, and rode a bus from Torreon, Coahuila, to Chihuahua state. 
“I saw one of the Zetas on a train shoot and kill a young Salvadoran boy, a 
teenager, who couldn’t pay $300 and didn’t want to get off the train,” 
Navarro. “On another occasion, a train conductor felt sorry for me because 
I was pregnant, and told us how to get on the train before it started 
moving. You had to pay extra if you didn’t want to catch a moving train.” 
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Throughout the trip that took several days, Navarro said she and her 
family suffered hunger, slept outdoors in the rain, walked for hours and 
dodged dangerous characters. 
Her family witnessed a woman left behind in a remote area after she had 
lost her foot when a train ran over her. They also watched as gang 
members yanked a young woman off the train. 
“The girl the gang took was beautiful,” Navarro said. “We heard her 
scream, but no one could do anything.” 
“After we reached Chihuahua, my husband did odd jobs and finally got a 
decent-paying job with a mining company in Guadalupe y Calvo,” 
Navarro said. “… A group of men wearing ski masks picked him up at 
night, and I never saw him again. That’s when I decided to head for the 
border to Juárez.” 
Navarro and her son reached Anapra, by then she was having sharp labor 
pains. A smuggler in Anapra told her he could get her and the son across 
the border for $1,000 cash. She didn’t have the money. The smuggler 
threatened to kill her if she didn’t come up with the money when he 
returned.191 
This woman’s account of her trip is common. The violence that is currently taking 
place in Central America and Mexico is now spilling over into the United States and 
Texas Specifically. Since MS 13 leadership structure has shifted to Central America, 
specifically El Salvador, it is possible that commands for action of MS 13 members 
across the United States originate from El Salvador where there is a Zeta-MS 13 
presence.192 Further, if continued deportation is favored with the influx of Central 
American immigrants, MS 13 has the capability to move repatriated gang members from 
the Northern Triangle in Central America to the United States in 72 hours.193 The Zeta-
MS 13 alliance in Central America is the primary partnership for MS 13, and has the 
potential to become the same for the Zetas. If that partnership becomes primary for both, 
the Zetas will have a presence in the majority of the United States, just like MS 13. 
                                                 
191 Diana Washington Valdez, “‘La Bestia’—Honduran Immigrants in El Paso Describe Journey on 
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The extended description of the Zeta-MS 13 vertical partnership is intentional and 
reflects the threat that arises from that alliance. The Zetas are military men, military men 
tend to act in a systematic manner. Their tactics and methods are useful to criminal 
organizations like MS 13. While the Zetas were using MS 13 as a gateway to the 
underworld of Central America, MS 13 was coming away as better criminals as it 
“absorbed skills and deviousness from their considerably more sophisticated and potent 
Mexican patron.”194 The Zetas have reportedly trained various members of MS 13 in 
locations across Central America195 Zetas also hold courses for up to six months at a time 
in Mexico and per the FBI have extended training into Texas using a ranch as a location 
for “training and ‘neutralizing’ of competitors.”196 Figure 7, shows the current tier 
ranking as provided in the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Gang Threat Assessment 
report. Figure 8, is a depiction of the Zetas known alliances. Both Figure 7 and 8, are 
useful in comprehending the potential for vertical integration of MS 13. 
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Figure 7.  Joint Crime Information Center 2013 Gang Rankings 
 
From Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Gang Threat Assessment “Joint Crime 
Information Center 2013 Gang Rankings,” (Austin, TX: Joint Crime Information Center, 
Intelligence and Counterterrorism Division, 2014), 9, http://www.dps.texas.gov/director 
_staff/media_and_communications /2014 /txGangThreatAssessment.pdf.  
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Figure 8.  Los Zetas and their links with US-based gangs 
 
From National Gang Intelligence Center, 2013 National Gang Report, “Major Mexican 
TCOs and their Links with US-based Gangs,”(Washington, DC: Author, 2013),22, 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-report-2013/view. 
Aside from the alliances in the U.S., Zetas have also worked with other cartels in 
Mexico. The Zetas have “situational alliances with the badly weakened Beltràn Leyvas, 
the even-more debilitated Juàrez Cartel and La Resitencia in Jalisco.”197 Their allies may 
not be the strongest, but the opportunity still exists for vertical integration by MS 13. The 
gang has an organic capability for further vertical integration into Central America 
through their own network. Having the Zetas there simply offers more potential growth 
by the use of the Zeta Network. This is relevant to Texas because the use of corridors 
within the state will likely take place a vertical and horizontal expansion take place. 
                                                 
197 Grayson and Logan, Executioner’s Men, 110–11. 
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C. RELEVANCE OF INTERSTATE CORRIDORS 
The Interstate Highway corridors of Texas are relevant and worthy of 
consideration when addressing the MS 13 network because of the proximity to Mexico. 
These corridors present the ability to move illicit materials into and across the United 
States. Illicit activity MS 13 is involved in includes, “drug distribution, extortion, 
prostitution, robbery, theft, human trafficking, and acting as sicaritos (assassins for hire) 
for transnational drug cartels.”198 The literature suggest that the horizontal and vertical 
integration of the MS 13 network will likely take place along the corridors as the 
corridors allow for movement of whatever product the gang looks to move. Figure 9, 
represents the various corridors within the state as identified by the DPS. The following 
is a list of the colors and what corridor they identify: green–Panhandle, yellow–West 
Texas, purple–Central Texas, blue–Gulf Coast, and orange–East Texas.199 
Figure 9.  State-wide Trafficking Corridors 
 
After Texas Department of Public Safety, “State-wide Trafficking Corridors,” image, 
Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013, (TX: Author, 2013), 21, 
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/threatOverview. 
pdf. 
                                                 
198 Sullivan and Logan, “MS -13 Leadership.” 
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The corridors in Figure 9, detail the ability of illicit material to travel across the 
state. Due to Texas’ proximity to Mexico, the potential for the vertical integration of MS 
13’s network has also be taken into account. Earlier, a reference to Mexico’s war on 
drugs was made. Since Mexico has various gateways into the United States, use of these 
corridors is highly likely by MS 13 to further establish its horizontal and vertical 
network. A detailed explanation of these drug corridors by the DPS is included below. 
• (U) The Texas–Mexico border area is one of the most active drug 
smuggling areas in the United States. There are 27 land Ports of Entry 
(POEs) spread along the border, including El Paso, Del Rio, Eagle Pass, 
Laredo, McAllen, Brownsville, and numerous small border towns. The 
five principal Texas corridors are West Texas, Central Texas, Gulf Coast, 
Panhandle, and East Texas. These corridors coincide with clusters of 
POEs along the border and major highways throughout the state. The 
Southwest Border remains the primary gateway for moving illicit drugs 
into the United States, mostly through overland smuggling. 
• (U) West Texas: There are four land POEs in El Paso. IH10 is the main 
route into and out of the El Paso region. IH10 crosses the country from 
California to Florida, serving as a trans- continental smuggling corridor. 
Once on IH10, traffickers can travel to San Antonio or Houston, or to 
Dallas-Fort Worth via IH20. 
• (U) Central Texas: The Central Texas Corridor includes the Laredo area 
and extends up to the Del Rio/Eagle Pass region. There are three major 
highways: 57, 90, and IH35. All three are used regularly by traffickers 
going to and from San Antonio, Dallas, and Austin. 
• (U) Gulf Coast: This corridor extends along the border from Brownsville 
to the Rio Grande Valley area, north to Houston and San Antonio. It 
includes highways US281, US77, IH37, IH10, and US59. These highways 
provide direct routes to and from Houston, San Antonio, and Dallas-Fort 
Worth, all of which are major consolidation points for drugs and currency.  
• (U) Panhandle: The main highway in the panhandle corridor, IH40, is a 
main artery for drug trafficking movement from Arizona, Colorado, New 
Mexico, and California to other states. 
• (U) East Texas: IH20, IH30, and IH35 are the main highways in the East 
Texas Corridor. IH20 and IH30 leave the east side of Dallas and connect 
with numerous other interstates and secondary roadways, while IH35 
provides access to the north.200 
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The figures provided throughout this thesis show that vertical and horizontal 
integration is taking place along these corridors, in and out of Texas. 
According to the research of Susan Ritter, Chair of the University of 
Texas Criminal Justice Department, there are at least 15 MS 13 cliques in 
Houston. Police in Houston have traced phone calls from MS 13 members 
there to Baltimore, Maryland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, 
DC, New Orleans, and Nuevo Laredo Mexico. These traced phone calls 
suggest constant communication between members of MS 13 Cliques 
located in cities across the nation.201 
The Houston Police Department was able to identify vertical integration by 
mentioning Nuevo Laredo, Mexico as a contact MS 13 cliques in Houston. While 
Mexico’s proximity makes it an ideal candidate for vertical integration, MS 13’s ability 
to vertically integrate from Texas extends far past Mexico—as does the presence of MS 
13. 
The dangers presented by the horizontal and vertical integration of MS 13 by 
using corridors in Texas are that the Zetas are a multifaceted TCO with ties to various 
prison and street gangs in the State. Texas Syndicate, Tango Blast, Mexican Mafia, 
Barrio Azteca, are all tier one gangs who operate with the Zetas in their human 
smuggling operations.202 MS 13 is named but represents the only tier two gang on the 
list. A question worth asking is how long will the only street gang to be named a TCO be 
considered a tier two gang by Texas? Considering the corridor centered horizontal 
network that is present in the 41 states plus Texas, and a vertical network that has a direct 
line to the border—the MS 13 network illustrated in this chapter will likely demand a tier 
one rating soon. The Zetas will be a primary reason for the increase in threat as the Zetas 
greatly expand the MS 13 Network. The risk does not end with the Zetas though. Any 
cartel that is able to reach the Texas border can take advantage of MS 13’s placement 
along corridors provide access to most places in the United States. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. MS 13 Presence in Texas Will Likely Grow Substantially in the Next 
Five Years 
The current immigration issues in Texas due to escalating violence in Central 
America suggest more and more Central Americans are going to immigrate into the 
United States and very likely use Texas as a landing pad. The map below shows over all 
gang activity in the state. 
Figure 10.  Concentration of Gang Activity in Texas 
 
From Texas Department of Public Safety, Gang Threat Assessment, “Concentration  of 
Gang Activity in Texas,” (TX: Joint Crime Information Center, Intelligence and 
Counterterrorism Division, 2014), 17, http://www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff/media _ 
and_communications /2014 /txGangThreatAssessment.pdf. 
The majority of Texas counties in the border region are gang infested. The 
situation of incoming Central American immigrants is almost identical to that of their 
compatriots who immigrated to escape violence more than thirty years ago. They are 
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poor, fleeing a country where homicide rates are on par with what they were during the 
civil war, and entering poor, gang-infested neighborhoods of the United States. Further, 
the anti-immigration sentiment is at an extremely high level. 
An example of the hostile environment Central Americans face upon arrival was 
made evident on July 23, 2015 when the U.S. House of Representatives used a recent 
murder in which the perpetrator is an illegal immigrant to launch an attempt to crack 
down on Sanctuary Cities.203 The White House said the bill calling for a crackdown 
would impede civil liberties by “allowing law enforcement officials to gather 
immigration status information from any person at any time.”204 Again, the current 
situation in Texas is almost identical to the environment that immigrants faced in L.A. 
where the gang originated – the difference today is the gang has established horizontal 
and vertical networks that reach Central America and most of the United States. 
Brenda Paz left no room for questions when she stated, “One day The Mara 
Salvatrucha will take over the United States.”205 Law enforcement and countless 
academics have documented the recruitment efforts of MS 13. MS 13 recruits youths, and 
with the influx of unaccompanied children coming into Texas in 2014, they offer some 
sense of familiarity to a young kid may feel alone while being detained in the United 
States. The proximity of Texas to Mexico and the various routes used by immigrants that 
land them along the Texas-Mexico border suggest MS 13 will have a large pool of 
potential members until the violent environment improves from Mexico to Central 
America. 
2. Texas Will Not Defeat MS 13 with Law Enforcement and Anti-
immigration Policy 
The data in this thesis highlights the results that stem from a U.S. policy and law 
enforcement centric approach being used to fight gangs. The use of immigration policy to 
deal with the gang problem in the early 1990s caused the balloon effect that established 
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MS 13 in Central America. Today, MS 13 is one of the main reasons the immigrants who 
are leaving Central America are trying to come to the U.S. The gang has flourished in 
Central America. A sign of the gang’s strength was shown when MS 13 and Calle 18 
formed a government-recognized truce in El Salvador. There was a well-documented 
drop in homicides. The homicide rate steadily climbed after the gangs stopped 
recognizing the truce. 
If a law enforcement approach is continued, Texas prisons will mimic Central 
American prisons in a very short time. This is due to the effect prison has on newly 
incarcerated gang members. The majority of Latinos, rivals or not, who are incarcerated 
tend to gravitate to gangs affiliate with the Mexican Mafia due to the need of protection 
from other prison gangs.206 The result of this is members of rival gangs could end up 
working side by side for the “most powerful and influential gang operating in the United 
States”—the Mexican Mafia.207 The likelihood of the prison gang MS 13 is affiliated 
with is high due to the demographics of South Texas. 
The Texas comptroller Susan Combs’ last report on South Texas demographics 
stated, “By 2012, the Hispanic population is projected to rise to 82 percent in South 
Texas, versus 37.6 percent in the state as a whole.”208 Bexar County, the county San 
Antonio is in, is showing that a Hispanic dense population will result in a Hispanic dense 
prison population. A report in The Prison Journal shows that almost 70% of men age 16–
45 that are incarcerated in Bexar County are Hispanic.209 Should a Law enforcement 
centered approach continue this could be disastrous for Bexar County and South Texas as 
a whole. As the second largest City in Texas, San Antonio will likely become a 
stronghold just like Dallas and Houston, if the approach to fight the gang is centered on 
law enforcement.210 San Antonio has a sixty-three percent Hispanic population, which is 
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significantly higher than L.A. where the gang originated.211 In L.A., a city with a smaller 
Hispanic population, MS 13 was implicated in five hundred murders by the early 
1990s.212 Possessing access to IH 10, IH35, and IH 37, and IH 90 San Antonio has the 
potential to be an artery for illicit activity across the state and nation. 
3. Stopping the Zetas Does Not Equate to Stopping MS 13 
The Zetas are the primary cartel that MS operates with but they are not the only 
one.213 MS 13 has shown the ability to work with multiple TCO’s as well as other gangs. 
MS 13 has stated that they can work with anyone but not for anyone.214 This means that 
the next Cartel that is calling shots in Mexico will be welcomed just like the Zetas were 
in place of the Sinaloa cartel. MS 13, aside from being a street gang is very aware of the 
benefits each alliance brings and what it brings to the table too. The Texas Gang Threat 
Assessment discusses the changes in traditional gang rivalries summarizing that in the 
end it is the money that matters. MS 13 has shown that very characteristic through their 
negotiation on La Bestia with the Zetas. In El Salvador, which is now the command 
center for MS 13, they held a truce with their biggest rival Calle 18. Other gangs in South 
Texas as well as cartels have shown the ability to put rivalries aside in the name of 
economic prosperity. With the rise of bosses who have spent their life in cartels like El 
Mencho of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the likelihood of a continued power 
struggle among cartels is high. 
Mexico’s cartels use prison and street gangs to enforce and transport for them. 
Since rival street gangs are going to prison and working together under the Mexican 
Mafia it is suggested that partnerships among American based street gangs will also 
continue to rise. Once street gangsters transit through prison and go back into the streets 
the bigger picture is easier to see and traditional rivalries will likely not stand in the way 
of making money. Further, MS 13 has visions of a much larger presence than they have 
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today. Many MS 13 members are using the government’s deportation practices to be sent 
to places with no MS 13 presence such as Chile, Peru, and Spain.215 MS 13 has also 
taken steps to develop a code in which to communicate. One of the avenues the gang is 
using to develop this code has the gang “sending members to study Nahuatl and other 
almost extinct regional languages, most with fewer than one hundred native speakers.”216 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Keep the Big Picture in Sight 
Texas has taken aggressive steps to construct a combined law enforcement 
approach to dealing with the increase of immigrants crossing the border and cartel 
activities. The Texas Department of public safety, Border Patrol, Department of 
Homeland Security, and other federal agencies have all been involved in Texas-Mexico 
border operations. The Zetas’ ability to own a 2 million dollar drug field in Webb County 
Texas shows that the field of vision may be too broad in my opinion. With the amount of 
law enforcement present, joint operations should expand the overall reach of all agencies 
involved. Yet, there seems to be a focus on catching as many immigrants as possible and 
not the right ones. Immigration has and will most likely always be an issue with our 
southern border, as long as the standard of living across the border is inferior to that of 
which we enjoy here. That does not mean that immigration enforcement should be 
relaxed. What I am recommending is a strategic, targeted approach to immigrant 
prosecution. It has been proven constantly that our borders are porous and that many are 
able to cross undetected. This is where keeping the big picture in mind will help focus 
our efforts. My recommendation is that we focus on the threat. 
The U.S. must make a decision on the target of law enforcement efforts. MS 13 
has shown the ability to get repatriated gang members back to the U.S. border within a 
72-hour period.217 Criminals should be the focus of our forces in my opinion. The other 
immigrants who come here are like any other American, simply trying to better their 
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future in a country notorious for opportunity. A proper risk assessment is critical in 
targeting the threat and not simply casting a wide net to catch anything out there. We can 
catch huge numbers of immigrants; we have proven that. However, the big picture here 
represents national security and keeping violent criminals out of our country. Most 
Central Americans are leaving the homicide capital in the Americas to try and survive, 
not commit crime. The non-criminal Central Americans risking their lives to get here 
should experience the same treatment as the working class Cubans who did so in the 
1980s. If they did, it is my opinion that they would quickly assimilate and become 
productive members of society. 
2. Use Best Practices in Dealing with MS 13 
Connie McGuire described many programs that had a positive effect on the Latino 
Gangs in Washington, DC. Some of these practices should be used by Texas to decrease 
the potential growth of MS 13 and other Latino gangs across the state. The most 
important best practice that should be employed being prevention. The increase of young 
Central American immigrants crossing the border leaves a huge number of potential 
recruits for MS 13 members across the state. Preventing these youths from seeing MS 13 
as their best option is crucial to stopping the growth of the gang. 
A kid who joins MS 13 is required to “put in work” which in most cases involves 
committing a crime. Imagine this kid is 13 at the time of the crime and gets caught. 
Automatically the trajectory of this kid’s life will be changed. Instead of going to school, 
the kid will most likely spend time in a juvenile detention center with other criminals 
who will influence the kid in one way or another. The worst part is once he gets out the 
kid will have earned stripes in the gang and be called on for criminal activity at a higher 
level. By the time this kid turns 18 a criminal record filled with previous police 
encounters will likely keep meaningful employment out of reach. Leaving manual labor 
or illicit activity through the gang the kid is now entrenched in as the only option. The 
cycle for a kid who joins a gang at a young age is vicious. Prevention through 
government involvement in schools, local churches, community centers, or neighborhood 
groups in at-risk Latino neighborhoods is highly recommended. 
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Having grown up in a gang-infested neighborhood I see prevention as the most 
useful tool for keeping kids out of gangs. Most of my friends’ families were affiliated 
with gangs until I began to play sports. Yet, my story is a little different because I had 
both parents at home and church was mandatory. Most kids in my neighborhood lived in 
single parent homes and the projects that were across the street from my house were 
constantly infested with latchkey kids running around while their parent(s) were at work. 
I have many friends and cousins that chose to be a part of a gang and in most cases, there 
is one event in their youth that changed the trajectory of their life. Some were able to pull 
away, but most did not. Getting a good paying job with gang affiliated tattoos and a 
criminal record keeps their gang as the primary source of income. Gang life is a cycle, 
and unless Texas focuses on prevention and providing an alternate course for youth MS 
13 will surely grow. 
3. Ask the Media to Help Limit Gang Exposure 
Throughout my thesis, I give credit to the media, through the CNN effect, for the 
expansion of MS 13. The media has power because people see what they broadcast 
across the world. I believe the media can still get their job done and limit the exposure 
provided to gangs and cartels. Currently, anytime a gang or cartel does something 
noteworthy their name is broadcasted before the world providing free exposure for the 
gang. By relaying the images of the gangs and cartels violent acts the media is spreading 
the influence of the gang through the images the come across the screen. This is why I 
believe gangs and cartels should remain nameless when being reported on. 
The idea of keeping MS 13 nameless in the media came after reading an article 
pertaining to a mass shooting that took place in Aurora Colorado in 2012. The families of 
some of the victims asked for the killers name to not be mentioned sighting that more 
attention was being given to the killer instead of the victim.218 The same can be said for 
gangs and cartels- specifically MS 13 and Zetas. There are countless documentaries made 
on MS 13. For every documentary there is a gang member ready to talk about gang life 
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and make the most of the appearance. Instead of giving MS 13 the spotlight it would help 
if the media would limit the use of their name. By simply using “gang” or “cartel,” the 
media can have a significant effect in limiting the exposure of these groups. The 
reasoning behind keeping the gang nameless in the media is the hope the MS 13 will lose 
motivation to gain media coverage as individual crimes will no longer be spreading its 
name over the airwaves as a reward for criminal behavior. MS 13 is prime for expansion 
in south Texas, as long as law enforcement knows who committed the crime, the media 
should do what it can to end the free publicity. 
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